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I. INTRODUCTION
The American legal system could provide full compensation if we
wished. The civil remedies of specific performance, injunctions and
restitution would accomplish the task in a wide variety of cases. Neverthe-
less, the civil system has been reluctant to employ these full compensation
remedies, what this Article shall term "prohibitory remedies," opting
repeatedly for obviously insufficient damages measured by plaintiff's loss.
The civil system's preference for damages and concomitant reluctance to
employ prohibitory remedies more regularly has been castigated as
"materialistic,"' "niggardly,"2 "amoral," 3 and showing "a marked solici-
tude for men who do not keep their promises." 4 Indeed, the large weight
of academic commentary is decidedly condemnatory.
1. Doug Rendleman, The Inadequate Remedy at Law Prerequisite for an Injunction, 33 U. FLA.
L. REV. 346, 348 (1981) ("Our materialistic society considers money an acceptable substitute for most
recognized interests.').
2. Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies-Efficiency, Equity, and the Second
Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 111 (1981).
3. Id. at 112.
4. E. Allan Farnsworth, Legal Remedies for Breach of Contract, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 1145, 1216
(1970).
5. The literature attacking the many facets of the common law's preference for money damages
is vast. See, e.g., OwEN M. FISS, THE CrviL RIGHTS INJUNCTION (1978); DoULAs LAYCOCK, THE
DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE (1991) [hereinafter LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE];
Farnsworth, supra note 4; Daniel Friedmann, Restitution of Benefits Obtained Through the
Appropriation of Property or the Commission of a Wrong, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 504 (1980); Douglas
Laycock, Injunctions and the Irreparable Injury Rule, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1065 (1979) (book review)
[hereinafter Laycock, Injunctions]; Linzer, supra note 2; Margaret Jane Radin, Compensation and
Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); Alan Schwartz, The Case for Specific Performance, 89
YALE L.. 271 (1979); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation In Law, 92 MICH. L. REV.
779 (1994); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified Theory of
Contract Remedies, 83 MICH. L. Ra.. 341 (1984). Even the defenses of the common law preference
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Perhaps because of the rather dogmatic and monolithic bent of the
academic commentary, the law's predilection for incomplete remedies has
been largely without apologists, save for the economist-lawyers who have
protested that remedies ensuring full compensation would be preferred were
it not for the omnipresent transactions costs that stand in the way.6 Even
this limited economic justification for the predominance of
undercompensatory damages has been thoroughly challenged on the ground
that the transactions costs of prohibitory remedies compare favorably with
those of damages.7
The more obvious line of defense has not been pursued. As Professor
Schwartz has noted, one possible reason why full compensation, here
referring to specific performance, is not routinely available is that "the
law's commitment to the compensation goal may be less than complete;
restricting specific performance may reflect an inarticulate reluctance to
pursue the compensation goal fully."' Schwartz, like others after him,
declined to address that possibility, preferring to "presuppose[] the
desirability of the compensation goal... [because] [n]either [a descriptive
nor normative theory] exists at present and creating them is beyond the
scope of this Article."
for damages have been half-hearted. See Anthony T. Kronman, Specific Performance, 45 U. CH. L.
REv. 351 (1978) (arguing that specific performance should be available in many cases, but not
routinely); Edward Yorio, In Defense of Money Damages for Breach of Contract, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1365 (1982) (arguing against specific performance, but proposing a rule that would measure damages
according to the cost of completion, rather than in accordance with traditional market value of loss).
6. The lawyer-economists identify two sources of these transactions costs. The first source is in
the difficulty courts might have in ascertaining a compensatory value in the absence of a conventional,
functioning market. See Kronman, supra note 5, at 355-65 (arguing that "unique" goods, for which there
is no market, present insuperable transactions costs to a judge arriving at a compensatory price, thus
militating in favor of an award of specific relief); Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Liquidated
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and
a Theory of Efficient Breach, 77 COLuM. L. REv. 554, 569-70 (1977) ('[W]here the subjective values
represented by the non-breacher's indifference curve are not reflected in any established market, the
compensation principle may be held to be inapplicable in practice; specific remedies mandating full
performance are commonly required where no monetary equivalency is ascertainable.). The second
source of transactions costs is the difficulty parties may have in contracting out of a prohibitory remedy.
See RICHARD A. PosNER, EcoNoMIc ANALYSiS OF LAW § 4.11 (3d ed. 1986) (admitting that although
specific performance solves the problem of undercompensation by damages, requiring seller to pay
buyer an additional amount to release the contract "imposes additional transaction costs"); Yorio, supra
note 5, at 1380-85 (arguing that buyers will tend to have lower cover costs than sellers, thus supporting
preference for damages, which place the onus of cover on buyers).
7. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 284-91 (arguing that the "post-breach negotiation costs"
associated with specific performance are no greater than the transactions costs of damages).
8. Id. at 274.
9. Id. at 274 n.16.
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Yet it is this line of inquiry that appears most productive, for it promises
to move the debate away from the bottomless speculation about transactions
costs to the more significant and logically prior question of whether the law
ought to be committed to providing full compensation as the proponents of
prohibitory remedies assume. Taking up the challenge implicit in
Schwartz's discussion, this Article attempts to provide a descriptive and
normative theory for the law's apparent disinclination to provide fully
compensatory remedies.
Understanding the reluctance of the remedial system to provide full
compensation requires first a focus on the commentators' criticisms of the
prevalent damages remedy. According to the critics, the traditional damages
remedy should not continue to predominate because it fails to provide
adequate deterrence against wrongdoing,"0 because it fails to require full
compensation," because it does not maximize wealth and achieve
efficiency, 2 because it lacks commensurability with the harm, 3 because
it signifies the "commodification" of personal rights and interests, 4 and
because it is simply not the right thing to do. 5
Instead of maintaining the dominance of the damages remedy, the legal
system should, according to the critics, supplant it substantially with
"prohibitory remedies" that prescribe a form of full compensation to be
accorded the plaintiff. Prohibitory remedies differ from damages remedies
in that they are designed to stop or undo completed transactions, even
involuntary ones. Unlike damages, prohibitory remedies are not justified on
the basis of harm caused, but rather on the basis of risk imposed; they seek
not to channel private risk-taking, but to prohibit it; if substitutionary, they
are measured not by harm, but by gain; they are not derived from private
agreement or private markets, but by court decree; and they signify an
attempt to generate appropriate, safety-producing behavior and adequate
compensation by judicial order, and thus do not depend upon a defendant
"correctly" configuring potential gains and potential losses prior to taking
action. 6 In short, prohibitory remedies attempt to "prohibit" harms;
10. See, e.g., Friedmann, supra note 5.
11. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5.
12. See, e.g., Ulen, supra note 5.
13. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 5.
14. See, e.g., Radin, supra note 5.
15. See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 2.
16. The remainder of this Article will provide further definition to the contours of the term
"prohibitory remedy." The historical phrase "equitable remedies" denotes many of the same remedies,
but the inexactness of that historical phrase, and the fact that some forms of these remedies, particularly
[VOL. 73:145
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damages remedies "price" them. 7
There are two problems, one practical and one normative, with a
remedial system that employs prohibitory remedies to provide full
compensation. First, practically, prohibitory remedies will not necessarily
produce deterrence, compensation, wealth, efficiency, or justice any better
than do damages remedies; in fact, in many cases they may do worse.
Second, normatively, the goal that underlies prohibitory remedies, that is,
full compensation, is not the unblemished good that the critics have
presumed it to be. Full compensation may only be achieved at a cost, not
just to defendants but to society, and it may be a cost that society prefers
not to bear. This practical and normative attack on full compensation also
provides the practical and normative justification for its denial.
Parts II and HI discuss the practical problem with prohibitory remedies,
that they are in fact inadequate to the tasks the critics have posited for
them. First, Part II outlines the central and pervasive dichotomy in the law
of remedies between pricing remedies and prohibitory remedies, and
attempts to characterize the remedies of injunctions, specific performance,
restitution, and some others as prohibitory in nature. Next, Part Im
examines the effectiveness of prohibitory remedies at fulfilling the central
tasks of the law of remedies, those of reducing the incidence of harm and
assuring compensation. Regarding harm, it argues that the routine
employment of prohibitory remedies will not only fail to reduce the risk of
harm but may actually tend to increase the incidence of undesirable harm-
causing activity. Similarly, it contends that the goal of full compensation
will likewise tend to be frustrated by the widespread adoption of prohibito-
ry remedies.
Parts IV and V present the normative justification for a remedial system
that relegates prohibitory remedies, and thus full compensation, to a
secondary role. First, Part IV questions the desirability of a remedial system
that actually seeks to compensate plaintiffs fully. Prohibitory remedies
represent a remedy that is at bottom a redistributional one, and not a
corrective one; thus their implementation properly depends on allocational
decisions that might sometimes disprefer a particular distribution, even one
that appears "fully compensatory." Part V attempts a rehabilitation of
restitution, appeared at both law and equity, requires the invention of what is hoped will prove to be
a better term.
17. This division in remedial law is similar to the division between conduct that the legal system
terms civil and that it terms criminal. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?:
Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 8.U. L. REV. 193 (1991).
1995]
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prohibitory remedies, suggesting a framework for their use that fulfills the
more limited aims for which they are suited. Properly understood,
prohibitory remedies provide needed deterrence in those cases where the
predominate damages remedy is insufficient. This Part also suggests that
the various "relegation doctrines" that traditionally inhibit the use of
prohibitory remedies, such as the irreparable injury rule and the "unique-
ness" test, properly maintain harm-based damages as the primary remedy
and thus desirably limit compensation for the sake of maximizing social
wealth and minimizing the needless infliction of harm.
II. PRIcIN AND PROHIBITORY REMEDIES
The law of remedies displays a pervasive division between loss-based
damages and prohibitory remedies. This division does not mirror the more
traditional one between equitable and legal remedies, or between substitu-
tionary and specific relief. These older notions do not fully capture the
fundamental choice contemporary courts must make between relegating
plaintiffs to remedies that seek to "price" illegal behavior and those that
seek to prohibit it.t"
This Part will survey the law of remedies and outline the dichotomy
between market-based damages, which are pricing remedies, and prohibito-
ry remedies. It will characterize the remedies of iajunctions, specific
performance, restitution, and some others as prohibitory, and will discuss
the significance of that characterization, demonstrating how the fulfillment
of prohibitory remedies' claim to fuller compensation and increased
deterrence, although not entirely improbable, rests substantially on the
timely and sagacious intervention of the judge who awards them.
A. The Pricing Remedies and Their Detractors
Damages are substitutionary, 9 measured in terms of the market or
"use" value of the damaged interests.2" Their use as a remedy for the
18. Generally, equitable and specific remedies may be classified as "prohibitory," while "legal"
and substitutionary remedies may be described as "pricing." This general proposition contains some
large exceptions, however, that demand a new set of descriptive terms. For example, some "legal"
remedies, such as replevin, and some "substitutionary" remedies, such as restitution, fall within the
category of "prohibitory."
19. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 572-73.
20. 5 ARTHUR L. CORBN, CoRBiN ON CONTRACrs § 1004 (1964) ("In the process of determining
values, market prices will always be used if such prices are available."); see also Id. at § 1022. Goetz
and Scott term this findament of damages the "objective compensation principle." Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, The Mitigation Principle: Toward a General Theory of Contractual Obligation, 69 VA.
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harm resulting from a tort or breach of contract facilitates risk-taking by
informing the potential wrongdoer or contract breaker of the "price" that
must be paid to generate profits. This "pricing" function encourages profit-
making activity, the "take and pay," at the expense of victimizing the
plaintiff.21 Damages based on harm engender theoretically sufficient
deterrence by ensuring that no breach of contract or other risk-causing
activity is undertaken where the defendant's expected damages exceeds the
expected gains.' As a result, protection of the plaintiff's interests depends
on the private, individualized decisions of a defendant weighing gains and
harms prior to taking action.
The traditional preference for damages remedies' and its reliance on
private decisionmaking has some discomforting ramifications. First, in the
case of contract, the law's predilection for the "expectation" measure of
damages, and its general rejection of more protective remedies such as
specific performance, suggests that breaches of contract are not only
tolerated but are apparently encouraged under appropriate economic
conditions.24 The law's encouragement of conduct that would be unethical
L REv. 967, 986 (1983). Resale or cover price may also be used to measure damages in place of the
market value of the loss.
21. For the seminal description of this liability function, see Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas
Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L.
REv, 1089, 1106-10 (1972).
22. See POSNER, supra note 6, § 4.8. For a summary of the efficient breach theory in the context
of contracts, see Linzer, supra note 2, at 114-15; for torts, see POSNER, supra note 6, § 6.1, at 147-51.
This deterrence would, in theory, be "perfect" only in the sense that it would provide a mechanism for
deterring conduct that causes more social harm than good; thus, this "perfect" deterrence would not
discourage socially profitable conduct that might cause a great deal of harm. The reliance measure of
damages also prices defendant's conduct, except in the unusual case where reliance damages exceed
expectation damages, such as in the case of a losing contract, and the plaintiff sues in quantum meruit,
a restitutionary damages measure. See, e.g., United States v. Algernon Blair, Inc., 479 F.2d 638 (4th
Cir. 1973). In such a case, the restitutionary remedy is prohibitive. See infra notes 101-22 and
accompanying text
23. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1154 ("[MIoney damages were regarded as the norm
and specific relief as the deviation, even where the law could easily have provided specific relief
without any cooperation from the defaulting promisor.).
24. See, e.g., RETATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS cl. 16, introduction (1981) ('The traditional
goal of the law of contract remedies has not been compulsion of the promisor to perform his promise
but compensation of the promisee for the loss resulting from the breach."). Breach is encouraged by
the "signal" the expectation measure sends to the parties that an offer superior to the expectation
damages award will yield a profit. In this sense, the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale, 156 Eng. Rep. 145
(1854) (limiting contract damages to those "fairly and reasonably... arising naturally, i.e., according
to the usual course of things'), renders damages predictable, thus facilitating breach. See Jeffrey M.
Perloff, Breach of Contract and the Foreseeability Doctrine ofHadley v. Baxendale, 10 J. LEGAL STUD.
39 (1981).
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in most contexts of human interaction demonstrates that deterrence in the
sense damages engenders is a term of some refinement, connoting a vision
of the social good that favors wealth maximization.' Second, this amoral
corollary of the traditional damages remedy appears in a worse light in tort.
Here, where the garden-variety cases frequently involve personal injuries,
sometimes tragic ones, the theoretician's celebration of the "liability"
regime appears callous. To be blunt, the legal system's traditional
preference for damages is a metaphorical way of saying that the desired
incidence of contractual and tortious harms is not zero.
Perhaps in light of the discomforting corollaries to harm-based damages,
it is not surprising that the tradition has been under attack in both scholarly
writing26 and judicial decisions,27  and along many different fronts. 28
Although this attack is diverse, it has one central theme: that the traditional
harm-based damages remedy should be supplanted by "prohibitory"
remedies that override the defendant's private calculus by prescribing the
protection to be accorded the plaintiff. This sustained criticism of damages
aims at generating a growing preference29 for prohibitory remedies such
as injunctions in their various forms, specific performance, and restitution
or disgorgement and its cousins such as rescission and reformation,
25. See Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 194 (1980) (questioning
whether "social wealth is a worthy goal').
26. See supra note 5.
27. See People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955) (adopting exclusionary rule in preference to
damages); Roger J. Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319 (detailing
the growth of the exclusionary rule). See generally Linzer, supra note 2, at 126-30.
28. The complaint against harm-based remedies arises in many contexts: the preference for specific
performance in lieu of damages, see Schwartz, supra note 5; the refusal to balance plaintiff 's request
for injunctive relief against the traditional "presumption" in favor of damages remedies, see LAYCOCK,
IREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra note 5; the preference for disgorgement, and not damages, in certain
cases, see William Drayton, Economic Law Enforcement, 4 HARV. ENvTu. L. REv. 1 (1980); the
argument in favor of exclusion, a disgorgement remedy, against a damages remedy to deter police
misbehavior, see Saul X. Levmore & William J. Stuntz, Remedies and Incentives in Private and Public
Law: A Comparative Essay, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 483, 490-95.
29. Professor Farnsworth has suggested that the restrictions against the use of specific performance
have been liberalized. Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1156 ("ITihe current trend is clearly in favor of the
extension of specific relief."). Regarding injunctions, one commentator has argued that the erosion of
the presumption in favor of damages has a long history. LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra
note 5, at 19 ("The death of the irreparable injury rule is not the product of recent judicial activism.').
Laycock examined 1400 cases to determine whether or not courts have tended to replace the traditional
damages remedy with a prohibitory one (injunctions) and concluded that, despite the supposed
presumption in favor of damages, the "plaintiff winds up with the very thing he wanted, and the
preference for specific relief becomes irrelevant." Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury
Rule, 103 HARV. L. REV. 687, 691 (1990).
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including the rule of exclusion in criminal cases."0
Prohibitory remedies function in an opposite manner from damages: they
implicitly or explicitly reject the market value of loss as an appropriate
measure of compensation. Instead, prohibitory remedies provide, by judicial
order, superior substitutionary or specific relief. Essentially, prohibitory
remedies justify judicial intervention into and curtailment of market-based
decisions on the promise of awarding greater compensation and generating
greater deterrence.
B. Injunctions
The injunction is the paradigmatic prohibitory remedy. It is explicitly
risk-based, issued to stop a threat of an inchoate harm.3 Its aim is, at a
minimum, to prohibit defendant's conduct that might lead to harm;
occasionally it will take the further step of mandating certain conduct to
lessen the risk of harm to an even greater extent.32 The injunction is
issued under the power of a government agent by court order, and it
enforces that power through public remedies, including coercive measures
or punitive sanctions.33 Unlike damages, which depend upon a defendant's
"correct" calculation of risks and gains, the injunction attempts to avoid
harmful actions through public orderings.34
As a result of the alleged demise of the "irreparable injury" rule, the
traditional limitation on the use of injunctions has been removed. An
increased use of the injunction promises to impact significantly on the roles
30. On the rule of exclusion as a restitutionary remedy, see Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 28, at
490
31. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding that a present threat of injury and not
merely a past wrong was required to give rise to equitable relief); Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 329 U.S. 321,
321 (1944) ("The historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish").
32. See I DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES § 2.9(1) (2d ed. 1993) ("The prohibitory injunction
forbids an act... . The mandatory injunction orders an affirmative act or course of conduct."). Professor
Fiss has suggested different classifications for injunctions. Fiss, supra note 5 (dividing injunctions into
reparative, preventive, and structural).
33. See generally I DOBBS, supra note 32, § 2.8; see also Rendleman, supra note 1, at 356-58.
34. Even though, in some cases, the legal rights to which the court's injunction gives effect were
generated by private arrangement, the remedy remains essentially "public," as the judge shapes the
remedy rather than passively accepting it from a conventional market, as is the case with damages
remedies, which rely on market values. The more difficult case is where the parties have tried to
contract into an injunction, much like they might agree to specific performance, liquidated damages,
or other outcomes. Here, the judge in ordering performance seems to act in accordance with contractual
intention. Nevertheless, there may be good reasons to fi-ustrate this intention by refusing to enforce the
provision. The rule against enforcement and its defense will be discussed infra notes 76-84 and
accompanying text.
1995]
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of the plaintiff and the judge in minimizing harmful behavior, an impact
that renders the injunction a problematical device for achieving remedial
goals.
1. The Rebirth of Equity
Equity is supposed to be moribund.35 It was obliterated as a federal
form of action with the merger mandated by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure;36 most states likewise no longer insist on rigid pleading in
conformance with the antiquated forms of action.37 Equity remains
significant, however, mainly because of the continuing employment of its
powerful remedies, particularly the injunction.3
Injunctions were historically relegated to a secondary status behind the
preferred remedy of harm-based damages, thus forming a "hierarchy" of
remedies. 39 This hierarchy of remedies found expression in the "irrepara-
ble injury" rule or "inadequate remedy at law" rule,4" which was thought
to require that an injunction would be issued only if the preferred remedy
of legal damages was "inadequate," or, to say the same thing, if the injury
was "irreparable" by ordinary money damages.
The irreparable injury rule, and the remedial hierarchy it established, has
35. Professor Dobbs begins his discussion of the history of equity by alluding to equity's demise:
"Two systems of courts once existed in Anglo-American law." 1 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 2.1(1); see
also id. ("Mhe separate courts of law and equity have long since been merged into a single court of
general jurisdiction.'); DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERicAN REMEDIES 5 (1985) ("[Tihe line
[between law and equity] is jagged and not especially functional; it can only be memorized.').
36. Rule 2 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: 'There shall be one form of action to
be known as 'civil action."' FED. R. Civ. P. 2.
37. Forty-six states and the District of Columbia have merged the historic legal and equitable
forms of action. The only states that have held out are Arkansas, ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-57-101 (Michie
1987), Delaware, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 341-45 (1974), Mississippi, Miss. CONST. art. 6, § 159
(1972), and Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-11-101 to -205 (1980).
38. The historical term "equity" also often becomes of relevance in contemporary cases involving
the right to trial by jury, the availability of which depends upon its traditional provision. See, e.g.,
Baltimore & Carolina Line v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) ('The right of trial by jury thus
preserved is the right which existed under the English common law when the [Seventh] Amendment
was adopted.').
39. Fiss, supra note 5, at 1, 38.
40. Id. at 1, 38-39. One writer has argued that the two formulations of the rule actually refer to
two different considerations. Gene R. Shreve, Federal Injunctions and the Public Interest, 51 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 382, 392-94 (1983). But cf. LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra note 5, at 8-9
(arguing that the two formulations refer to the same consideration).
41. SeeDevelopments in theLaw-Injunctions, 78 NARV. L. REV. 994,997-1021 (1965) (identifying
the many ways in which a legal remedy may be deemed "inadequate).
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been under sustained academic attack.42 The rule's detractors have termed
the rule "dead" in theory, in logic, and in practice, claiming it is of little
use either in understanding the law or in resolving cases.43 Indeed,
understood literally, the irreparable injury rule could never preclude
injunctive relief." A plaintiff would almost always be better compensated
by an order directing defendant to do precisely what plaintiff would prefer
than by a sum of money designed to compensate plaintiff for harm.45 This
preference might often obtain even in regard to an award of damages
sufficient to allow plaintiff to obtain a substitute performance, for by
defendant's provision of the performance the plaintiff avoids the costs
associated with locating and acquiring a sufficient replacement.46
Further, according to the critics, a literal understanding of the irreparable
injury rule renders it of negligible importance except as a "tie-breaker," and
a seldom-used one at that.47 The rule expresses a technical presumption
in favor of awarding legal damages only where those damages are
equivalent to the equitable award. This equivalency might result, though
rarely, where the item lost is a fungible item for which a ready market is
available." In virtually any other circumstance, the supposedly important
irreparable injury rule is irrelevant to the decision whether or not to award
equitable or legal relief.
Indeed, it appears that common law courts have long disregarded the
42. Professor Linzer reported that the inadequacy rule was termed "since Justice Story's day...
'essentially a jurisdictional anachronism"' Linzer, supra note 2, at 122 (quoting John P. Frank's remarks
at the 1979 meeting of the American Law Institute). See also Farnsworth, supra note 4; Fiss, supra note
5; LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra note 5.
43. The most compelling statement of this position is found in LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY
RULE, supra note 5; and Laycock, Injunctions, supra note 5.
44. Laycock, Injunctions, supra note 5, at 1071 ("[N]o legal remedy is adequate unless it is 'as
complete, practical and efficient as that which equity could afford.") (quoting Terrace v. Thompson,
263 U.S. 197, 214 (1923)).
45. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 274 ("Specific performance is the most accurate method of
achieving the compensation goal of contract remedies because it gives the promisee the precise
performance that he purchased.').
46. Id. at 275-78.
47. Laycock, Injunctions, supra note 5, at 1069-70. Assuming that no legal remedy is "adequate"
unless it affords relief "as complete, practical and efficient" as equity, see supra note 44, then:
I. Plaintiff is entitled in all cases to the most complete, practical, and efficient remedy.
2. If a legal and an equitable remedy are equally complete, practical, and efficient, the legal
remedy shall be used.
Laycock, Injunctions, supra note 5, at 1071. Thus, the rule simply breaks ties that might occur under
the second proposition. Id.
48. But see Schwartz, supra note 5, at 275-78 (identifying costs to plaintiff of acquiring fungible
substitute performance).
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supposed preference for legal damages expressed in the irreparable injury
rule. Professor Laycock's review of a large sample of recent decisions
indicated that the irreparable injury rule infrequently provided a bar to
obtaining equitable relief.49 Moreover, courts have recently found
"irreparable injury" in such a variety of contexts that, "[i]f plaintiff has any
plausible need for specific relief, she can describe that need as irreparable
injury and find ample precedent to support her claim."50
The demise of the irreparable injury rule's limitation on the availability
of injunctive relief suggests that courts should award an injunction to any
plaintiff who wants one, provided other elements are satisfied."1 In other
words, if the goal of remedial law is to provide full compensation,52 and
the plaintiff informs the court that equitable relief is the relief that better
affords compensation to the plaintiff, then the court should give the
preferred prohibitory relief. Injunctions should issue "automatically" upon
request.5
3
2. The Effect of Frequent Injunctions
If the traditional presumption in favor of money damages is indeed dead,
a conclusion not free from doubt,54 then the emergence of the injunction
49. Laycock, supra note 29.
50. Id. at 722.
51. Professor Laycock has proposed a series of rules and considerations to supplant the irreparable
injury parameter. LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra note 5, at 265-79 (suggesting that courts
allow plaintiff a choice of remedies, limited by such notions as "undue hardship, burdens on third
parties, impracticality," and other considerations).
52. Professor Yorio argued that the goal of full compensation should not be the sole goal of
remedial law, and that it should be tempered by other considerations, such as fairness and efficiency.
Yorio, supra note 5, at 1370-88.
53. Professor Laycock has argued that plaintiffs should be "presumptively entitled to choose either
a substitutionary or specific remedy," although not without some of the traditional "hardship"
considerations qualifying that entitlement. LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra note 5, at 266-
68. This notion of an "automatic" injunction has been presented in unalloyed fashion regarding specific
performance of contractual obligations. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 305 ("[P]romisees should be able to
obtain specific performance on request.").
54. There are several reasons to question the accuracy of Professor Laycock's empirical finding
that courts do not use the irreparable injury rule to relegate plaintiffs to legal damages. Laycock's
survey of cases was limited to federal and state cases culled from digest entries and cases appearing in
various "new cases" reporters. Laycock, supra note 29, at 701. Unavoidably, this sampling may have
been too limited in several respects. Injunctions frequently are sought as preliminary or temporary relief,
asking judges to order or restrain certain actions on short notice, effective immediately. Presumably,
many of these requests are turned down for various reasons, one of which may be that the plaintiff
should be satisfied with money damages. It is likely that extremely few of these emergency decisions,
particularly those in state courts, are the subject of a formal written opinion, and even less likely that
(VOL. 73:145
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol73/iss1/3
19951 THE FALLACY OF FULL COMPENSATION
from the ashes of the irreparable injury rule threatens a loss of the benefits
that the irreparability rule latently provided. At bottom, the irreparable
injury rule allocated the burden of risk-taking to potential defendants, to
those about to engage in risk-producing behavior." Thus, the rule allowed,
and perhaps encouraged, the potential plaintiff to remain unconcerned about
hypothetical infringements of his fights or interests. To a great extent,
plaintiff enjoyed his safety as a consequence of the risk-creation decisions
taken by others. 6
Similarly, the irreparable injury rule lessened the difficulty the judge
experienced in remedying harms. The bias created by the irreparable injury
rule in favor of damages actions allowed the judge to act basically as a trial
referee, regulating the information transmitted to the jury and providing
instructions to inform the jury's deliberations. In damages actions the jury
must make the difficult remedial decision. Even in bench trials involving
the determination of damages, the judge's decision was not as hard as it
could be, because the decision in a damages case, although sometimes a
matter of close judgment, is unidimensional, consisting of the ascertainment
of a monetary award approximating loss.
The rule's demise promises a novel and more burdensome role for
a ruling that did produce an opinion would be published in one of the popular digests, which focus, at
the state level, on appellate opinions. Thus, any firm conclusions about the viability of the irreparable
injury rule in these cases would appear unavailable from Laycock's sampling. Even with regard to
permanent injunctions, many state and federal courts do not always publish their opinions. Moreover,
Laycock's search provided no means to determine, even in a rough, experiential way, the number of
cases where plaintiffs voluntarily, or upon successful motion of the defendant, pared down the requests
for relief in light of the rule.
Finally, in regard to those cases that did generate published opinions on appeal, this subset of all
cases would appear particularly likely to generate decisions where the irreparable injury rule did not,
as Laycock found, seem to matter: parties whose requests for injunctions are refused at the trial level
for failure to show "irreparable injury" are particularly unlikely to appeal. First, the passage of time will
render the request for an injunction moot. Second, the trial court's decision on this issue is a "factual
finding," protected from reversal under the "clearly erroneous" standard of review, thus diminishing the
number of losing parties who will attempt to raise an appelate issue on those grounds. Consequently,
it is unsurprising that Laycock found few appellate decisions reversing on the basis of the irreparable
injury rule.
Of course, the fact that the empirical result is ambiguous does not necessarily mean that Professor
Laycock is wrong in his conclusion. Rather, it suggests that his conclusion does not appear to be
supported by persuasive empirical evidence. Cf Gene R. Shreve, The Premature Burial of the
Irreparable Injury Rule, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1063, 1064-65 (1992) (book review) (arguing that
"[niumerous cases cited in the book suggest that the rule is alive in the minds of judges").
55. See supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
56, Of course, certain doctrines, such as avoidable consequences and limitations on foreseeability,
induce potential plaintiffs to take adequate safety precautions. See infra note 269 and accompanying
text
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plaintiffs in detecting violations of law and for courts in remedying them.
Regarding plaintiffs, the demise of the "inadequacy" requirement puts great
stress on the "standing" or "injury" element, the only ground remaining for
courts to deny equitable relief5 This requirement states that plaintiff must
allege and prove that he suffers from an impending "threat of harm"
sufficient to give rise to an adequate controversy. 5 Thus, the successful
action for an injunction puts a premium on a plaintiff's ability to sense
impending injury and on a plaintiff's ability to seek judicial redress
quickly, prior to the threat's actualization. It seems probable that the mere
threat or promise of some future harm tends, in most cases, to be more
difficult and costly to detect than a past harm. 9 If that is true, then
plaintiffs bear a greater burden in a regime that prefers injunctions to harm-
based damages. In a regime of injunctions, it is decidedly the plaintiff's job
to sense impending harms and take action to avoid them; in a damages
regime, this task belongs to the defendant.
The irreparability rule's demise also promises to ask much of judges, to
the extent that ordering personal injunctive relief ordinarily requires greater
judicial supervision and other resource expenditures than does a trial to
ascertain money damages.60 The burden of issuing the injunction falls on
57. If courts are unable to rely upon the irreparable injury rule to deny requests for injunctive
relief, then the primary element separating a plaintiff from the relief is that the "threat of injury" be
sufficient. Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110 (1983) (requiring "a real and immediate threat').
The injury requirement and its correlatives play a similar role in other contexts. See infra notes 222-26
and accompanying text; Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937) (holding
that a declaratory judgment plaintiff must present a "justiciable controversy ... [that is] definite and
concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests'); Ayers v. Jackson
Township, 525 A.2d 287, 304-08 (N.J. 1987) (holding that a lack of"actual injury" constitutes grounds
for denying relief to plaintiffs seeking compensation for inflicted risk of cancer).
58. See Lyons, 461 U.S. at 105 (holding that plaintiff failed to "establish a real and immediate
threat that he would again be stopped... by an officer or officers who would illegally choke him into
unconsciousness without any provocation or resistance on his part').
59. Exceptions to this assertion are not hard to imagine. In a case involving competitive injury to
a large business, for example, it may be harder to detect the fact that one's business has been harmed
than it is to ascertain that someone might be inclined to do that harm. In any event, the textual
proposition is simply that a system that relies on plaintiff-generated harm-avoidance necessarily depends
on the opposite (and doubtful) assertion being true, to wit: that plaintiffs may deduce more easily that
they might be harmed in the future than they can determine that they have been harmed in the past.
Conversely, a system that seeks deterrence through harm-based remedies relies on the presupposition
that completed harms are easier to perceive than inchoate threats.
60. A number of commentators have debated whether the administrative costs of injunctions are
greater than the alternative damages remedy. See, e.g., Schwartz, supra note 5, at 292-96 (arguing that
administrative costs are probably not greater for injunctions than for damages); POSNER, supra note 6,
§ 4.11 (arguing that specific performance is more costly to administer than damages remedy). See
generally LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra note 5, at 223 ("The less adequate the damages
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the trial judge, and it is a difficult one. The injunction requires the judge
to prescribe a course of behavior of a party, ordering that the defendant
perform or not perform certain activity. This entails a theoretically complex
set of predictions. An injunction is based on a prediction that the
defendant's course of conduct, if continued, would cause legally cognizable
harm to the plaintiff.61 Thus, in issuing an injunction, the judge must
make a prediction of the defendant's behavior,62 a prediction whether or
not the anticipated behavior will harm the plaintiff in a legally cognizable
way,63 and whether or not the form or language of the injunction that the
judge contemplates will be effective in preventing that harm.' As a result,
it appears likely that the increasing use of injunctive remedies in a world
without a remedial hierarchy tends to render the judge's task more difficult,
and simply multiplies the opportunities to err.6"
3. An Example of an Injunction's Difficulty
Consider the difficulty confronting the judge who wishes to enter an
injunction in a relatively simple case. Imagine a stock broker, Sue, who
leaves the employ of one broker/dealer firm, Traditional, for its competitor,
remedy, the more willing courts are to undertake complex specific relief."). In certain cases, such as
one involving the anticipatory repudiation of a take-and-pay contract for ten years' requirements for
purchase of a commodity on a fluctuating price scale, measuring damages appears to present as difficult
a task as devising and administering an injunction. The damages remedy in such a case is difficult to
devise because it attempts to make extended and tenuous predictions about the future. Thus, the
damages remedy appears as complex as an injunction precisely where it partakes of one of the essential
attributes of the injunction.
61. Timothy S. Jost, From Swift to Stotts and Beyond: Modification of Injunctions in the Federal
Courts, 64 TEx. L. REv. 1 101, 1101-02 (1986) ("[A] court can only predict the obligor's future conduct
based on its understanding of the obligor's present and past conduct.").
62. Id. at 1102 ("The parties act within a dynamic socioeconomic context in which their behavior
and relationship are subject to constant change.").
63. Id
64. This latter aspect of the judge's prediction has been overlooked, but it may constitute the most
difficult of the predictions. The judge's prediction as to the effectiveness of his order parallels the
prediction made by regulatory agencies when they prescribe behaviors to prevent harms. The frequent
inaccuracy of the prescriptions of these regulators, despite being informed by comprehensive fact-
finding and substantial resources, see, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM (1982);
PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE REGULATED INDuSTRIES AND THE ECONOMY (1979); GEORGE J. STIGLER,
THE CITIZEN AND THE STATE: ESSAYS ON REGULATION (1975), does not bode well for the lonely trial
judge who would attempt to perform the same function through the injunction. See also Jost, supra note
61, at 1104 ("The future tricks the court; the injunction, the court's now outdated prediction, plods off
into irrelevancy, leaving the beneficiary bereft of protection or the obligor subject to oppression.").
65. But see Fiss, supra note 5, at 80-85 (arguing that the degree of prediction problems attendant
to the injunction are not unusual among legal instruments).
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Progressive. Sue resigns on a Friday afternoon. Immediately after she
leaves the office, Sue mails letters and begins placing telephone calls to the
customers she serviced while at Traditional, encouraging them to transfer
their accounts to her at Progressive. This solicitation is in direct violation
of Sue's employment agreement with Traditional, which provides that she
will not solicit these customers should she leave. By Monday, one hundred
of Sue's three hundred clients have mailed their transfer directives to
Traditional. On Tuesday, Traditional's lawyers file suit in the state trial
court, asking the judge to issue a preliminary injunction, a prohibitory
remedy.
The first question for the judge who would enjoin Sue is whether or not
the injunction's terms should be limited to plaintiff's legal right, as
provided by the contract. An injunction so strictly limited would provide
simply that Sue not "solicit" her former customers; thus implying that she
could talk to them by telephone, write them letters, take them to lunch, and
so forth, all in a subtle effort to win their transfer of business, so long as
she did not utter the words or act in an overt manner that would constitute
a solicitation. Obviously, an injunction of this sort does little to protect the
interests of Traditional. Moreover, the court might be disinclined to issue
such a narrow injunction because of a fear of easy circumvention of the
spirit of its injunction, distrust of Sue's willingness to comply, and concern
that Sue could easily "solicit" during a private conversation and not be
caught. Thus, the court might prefer to craft an injunction that contains a
"bright line" more easily enforced.
How is that broader injunction to be crafted? This issue is of paramount
importance, because a contempt citation, with possible summary imposition
of penalties or criminal prosecution, looms as the remedy for violation of
the court order. One concern in drafting an injunction that gives plaintiff
slightly more than its contractual right involves treating the customers
appropriately. Should the injunction allow Sue to service those customers
who have already transferred their accounts to Progressive? What about
those customers who have decided to transfer, but have yet to mail their
directive: should the injunction attempt to preclude their transfer, a remedy
that thwarts the wishes of a party not before the court? What about those
customers who have yet to read Sue's letter: should their freedom to do
business as they please be stopped by a contract between Sue and
Traditional?
Another set of problems arises in regard to the idea of "solicitation." If
former customers call Sue, should Sue be allowed to speak with them? May
Sue tell the customer where she is now employed, and in what capacity?
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May Sue accept and welcome the customer's business? Can she send a
letter announcing her new position? Although one might be inclined to
prohibit all communications between Sue and her former customers,
Traditional's employment contract states that Sue is only prohibited from
"solicitation," which is a subset of "communication." On what basis is the
judge to decide, ahead of time, what sort and nature of communication
constitutes solicitation?
Finally, the judge's simple injunction here will have to deal with
Progressive. Assuming, say, that the judge orders Sue to accept no new
customers after the date the preliminary injunction is entered, may those
customer accounts be given to other Progressive agents? May Sue share in
those profits? All these are basic predictions that must be made to fashion
an effective injunction in a simple case. The relevant issues in the example
could be multiplied if an additional yet common complexity is introduced,
such as an alleged conversion of intangible assets.
The crafting of an injunction requires much thoughtfulness, both to
perceive the issues that will shortly develop and to resolve them in a way
that appropriately protects the rights and interests of each party. The mental
process the judge must undertake to draft a sound injunction imitates the
process a legislature follows in crafting a law, anticipating a multitude of
hypothetical problems and controversies and providing as much as possible
for their appropriate resolution. This is a difficult task, one which
legislatures overcome by such means as staff, hearings, and the sheer
advantage of size, bringing to bear the minds of many representatives and
their assistants. The judge has far fewer resources, working with a thin staff
and lawyers for the parties who may have spent little time thinking about
the form the remedy should take if they win or lose.
Of course, the complexity discussed in Sue's case is artificially
diminished: imagine the task confronting a federal district court judge
attempting to harbor all the necessary information and make predictions in
order to craft a workable injunction in a more complex context involving
school district pupil assignments or prison conditions.' These larger
problems introduce the additional complexity of human reaction to the
injunction, captured by sociologists with phrases like "white flight."'67
Further, to the extent that an injunction looks far into the future, it risks
66. See generally Jost, supra note 61, at 1103-04 (noting the dynamic nature of several factual
scenarios).
67. See Eleanor P. Wolf, Northern School Desegregation and Residential Choice, in 1977 Sup.
CT. REv. 63, 67-69 (Philip B. Kurland & Gerhard Cospar, eds.).
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changes in the legal environment that might render an injunction obso-
lete,68 although recent Supreme Court decisions have made injunctions
easier to manage." It should not surprise that, along with some apparent
successes, recent history has recorded some spectacular struggles in the
attempt to resolve complex disputes with injunctions. 0
4. Summary and Analysis
At bottom, the injunction represents the rejection of the proposition that
defendants take sufficient precautions to avoid harming plaintiffs. It signals
a preference for judicial prohibition over private decisionmaking, and for
plaintiff-initiated harm-avoidance over defendant-initiated harm-avoidance.
A behavioral model of this preference would suggest that plaintiffs choose
to undertake the cost of harm-avoidance where they perceive that the
benefits from an injunction exceed the value of the alternative, "fallback"
damages remedy by an amount superior to the costs of locating the threat
and obtaining the injunction. In this simple model, the plaintiff appears to
bear both added costs and benefits, thus suggesting that plaintiff should be
permitted his choice of remedy.
The normative power of this simple behavioral model is limited,
however, because it does not account for the added social costs that derive
from the difficulties the injunction adds to the task of the judge who must
make multiple predictions about the future. These social costs may provide
a reason, at least in cases where they are large, to deny plaintiff his
remedial preference and relegate him to a remedy that is inferior from his
perspective. Thus, the costs that the injunction may present in some cases
to the judge provides a justification for legal doctrines, such as the
irreparable injury rule, that in some cases relegate plaintiff to a damages
remedy.7
1
Along with providing a justification for the irreparable injury rule, this
68. See Jost, supra note 61, at 1102 ("[Tjhe court's assumptions about the future almost inevitably
fail as the law changes.').
69. See Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, 502 U.S. 367 (1992) (liberalizing the "grievous
wrong" modification standard of United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932)).
70. See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, 856 F.2d 444,448-52 (2d Cir. 1988), cerl. denied
in part, 489 U.S. 1065 (1989), and rev'd in part sub nor. Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265
(1990) (recounting the difficult struggle for a federal district judge to command obedience, through a
variety of coercive contempt procedures, to an injunction directing the placement of public housing in
Yonkers).
71. See infra notes 294-99 and accompanying text for a discussion of how the irreparable injury
rule relegates certain cases to the damages remedy.
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analysis also questions the claims that the injunction supplies the plaintiff
with more perfect compensation and burdens the defendant and potential
defendant with increased deterrence. These claims appear dubious in light
of the observation that the injunction can incur various social costs not
necessarily present with respect to the alternative damages remedy. Thus,
plaintiff's "fuller compensation" may not necessarily represent a direct
transfer to the plaintiff from the "wrongdoing" defendant; instead,
plaintiff's added compensation comes at the expense of another party
innocent of wrongdoing. Understood as a transfer from the social innocent
to the plaintiff, then the moral appeal of those who claim that the
injunction ought to be provided because it is the "right thing to do" seems
less a matter of moral obligation than a matter of social allocational choice.
Moreover, to the extent that the cost of fuller compensation is borne
socially, and not directly by the defendant, then little or no increase in
deterrence, specific or general, appears probable.
Finally, the likelihood that the remedy of the injunction would provide
better compensation and augmented deterrence might be further diminished
by the defendant. To the extent that the defendant does view the possibility
of being subject to an injunction as a penalty more onerous than damages,
then defendant would be impelled to undertake expenditures to avoid
discovery of incipient harms. Describing this behavior in terms of a model,
the defendant would be inclined to expend resources to avoid detection to
the extent that his profit from the harm-causing conduct exceeded the cost
of avoidance. As a result, the plaintiff's ability to detect the threat of harm,
and perhaps even the judge's ability to unravel it, would be corresponding-
ly diminished, at some point leaving the plaintiff relegated to the damages
remedy, but in the worsened condition of having wasted funds to detect a
threat of harm on the promise of the "automatic injunction," and also
relegated to collecting damages from a defendant who is marginally poorer
by the amount of funds wasted in avoiding detection.
In brief, the claim of those who would bury the law's preference for the
damages remedy over the injunction must be tested against the possibility
that a routinely available injunction remedy would elicit a series of
behavioral responses from plaintiffs, defendants, and judges that might
render the injunction's promise of "full compensation" and increased
deterrence of dubious merit, and that might also elicit wasteful expenditures
undertaken in an effort to avoid the occasional harshness of the remedy.
Aside from these behavioral issues, permitting plaintiffs access to
injunctions on demand ignores the social implications that in some or many
cases militate in favor of denying that choice to plaintiff, and instead
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relegating the plaintiff to the alternative, "adequate" damages remedy.
C. Specific Performance
Similar in effect to the injunction is the remedy of specific performance.
Like the injunction, specific performance involves a judicial mandate
directed at the defendant, here to fulfill the terms of a contract. Unlike the
injunction, however, specific performance cannot readily be identified as
prohibitory. Instead, this remedy appears to be privately generated: in
theory, the parties have agreed to abide by the terms of a contract, and the
contract presumably stems from a noncoerced, market-based transaction.72
Thus, the judicial order mandating performance appears merely to fulfill the
arm's-length bargain.73 Performance appears to vindicate private, market-
generated decisionmaking, not to override it. Similarly, again unlike the
injunction, the judge in ordering performance is not necessarily faced with
difficult problems of prediction or accuracy of the order.7 In part
stemming from its volitional appearance, the remedy of specific perfor-
mance has long been a favorite of academics, who urge its adoption as the
routine remedial outcome in cases involving breach of contract.7'
1. Is Specific Performance Prohibitory?
It is doubtful that the remedy of specific performance in many cases
represents a vindication of private decisionmaking.76 To the contrary,
given the prevalence of market-based damages for breach of contract,77
72. See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 2, at 112 ("'[M]orality' stands for the idea that it is both fair and
appropriate to hold people to promises that they freely made.'). Professor Kronman has argued that the
remedy of specific performance for contracts involving "unique" goods actually reflects what the parties
would agree to were they able to impose remedial choices on courts. Kronman, supra note 5, at 365-69
(arguing that buyers prefer performance for obvious reasons and that sellers in unique goods cases are
mostly indifferent, due to the unlikely event of a better offer where there is no market).
73. Linzer, supra note 2; cf. Schwartz, supra note 5, at 279-84 (disputing Kronman's analysis of
hypothetical contractual intent).
74. The judge's order of specific performance can, however, be as complicated as an injunction
in cases where performance will require extended relations between the parties.
75. See Linzer, supra note 2; Schwartz, supra note 5; Sunstein, supra note 5; cf Yorio, supra note
5 (arguing a modified money damages remedy for breach of contract).
76. Professor Yorio has offered a similar argument based on the ex ante expectations of
contracting parties. Yorio, supra note 5, at 1371-72. Yorio also argues that specific performance gives
promisees the ability to fulfill noncontractual aims, such as spite or vindictiveness. Id. at 1373.
77. Seaman's Direct Buying Sere., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1934) (Bird, C.J.,
concurring) ("[Tihe assumption that parties may breach at will, risking only contract damages, is one
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the parties to many contracts probably anticipate, to the extent they think
of it at all, that breaches will result in a substitutionary remedy of money
damages.7" Of course, this presumed expectation would differ if specific
performance constituted the "preformulated rule"79 or default rule. To the
extent that the parties' presumed intention is a function of the background
legal rule, an argument founded in contractual intention presents a
hopelessly circular puzzle.8"
However, whatever the contractual expectation formed by the default
rule, it is possible that the parties do not in fact intend to provide for the
remedy of performance. Professor Yorio, in his analysis of contractual
expectations, has argued the plausible proposition that contracting parties,
in failing to provide a remedial clause, may have implicitly desired to
reserve the remedial issue for postbreach resolution.8" Thus, if courts are
to presume, as others argue,82 that the absence of a remedial clause
indicates that performance is the intended remedy, then courts should feel
obliged to award performance, even to the point of absurdity, such as
where the plaintiff prefers damages.83
These arguments about contractual intentions, however, seem incomplete:
any answer will serve to supplant silence. For example, it also seems quite
plausible to hypothesize that, along the continuum from mandated
performance to unfettered remedial discretion, the parties intend an interim
position: that plaintiff presumptively should be relegated to the most
common remedy unless compelling reasons allow a preference. Because
this outcome roughly describes the historical practice by which courts
awarded specific performance,"' it seems as persuasive, if unhelpful, as
any other. The "background rule" is another way of speaking about the
"background remedial intention," and each derives ultimately from the
78, For an argument that the present presumption in favor of the damages remedy probably does
reflect parties' intentions, see Kronman, supra note 5.
79. Goetz & Scott, supra note 20, at 971 & n.12 ("By providing standardized and widely suitable
risk allocations in advance, the law enables most parties to select a preformulated legal norm 'off-the-
rack,' thus eliminating the cost of negotiating every detail of the proposed arrangement.").
80. Professor Kronman has argued that the parties likely ex ante preferences are that specific
performance should be limited to cases involving "unique" goods, tracking the common law limitation.
See Kronman, supra note 5, at 365-69. It seems questionable, however, that promisors would share this
preference, even in unique goods cases. See infra note 213.
81. Yorio, supra note 5, at 1371-72.
82. See supra notes 72-73 and accompanying text.
83. Yorio, supra note 5, at 1372.
84. Kronman, supra note 5, at 355-58; EDwARD YoRIo, CONTRACT ENFORCEMENT: SPECIFIC
PERFORMANCE AND INJUNCTIONS §§ 2.1-2.2 (1989).
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remedy that the legal system prefers.
2. The Effect of Performance on Markets
To resolve the issue of whether specific performance is essentially a
market-generated remedy or one imposed externally and prohibitively, the
inquiry must be turned away from the indeterminate examination of
hypothesized contractual intentions and toward an examination of the effect
of specific performance on markets. Underlying this inquiry is an
assumption: if specific performance is fundamentally a market-generated,
intention-vindicating remedy, then specific performance should not diminish
the range and availability of market transactions. This assumption is
founded on the view that markets tend to produce diversification in price
and quality on account of differences in the individual tastes that form a
market.85 Consequently, legal rules that tend to reduce the available range
and diversity of markets must do so by frustrating the exercise of some
people's choices, thus suggesting that these legal rules are not, for these
people, a product of choice, but are external and prohibitory.
Specific performance frustrates diversity in market transactions. First,
specific performance restricts price flexibility. By routinely requiring that
sellers, for example, specifically perform their contracts, specific perfor-
mance hinders the ability of sellers to discriminate among their buyers. In
a market characterized by rising production costs and breaches, a producer
cannot favor his "good customers," and instead must treat all buyers alike.
Moreover, buyers who seek "second-class" status in the event of limited
supply in exchange for discount prices are hindered as well. This is not to
say that, in any contractual setting, the parties are bound by the
preformulated rule; of course they may incur the expense of altering it. 6
85. In other words, this analysis assumes that unregulated markets will feature breadth and
expansion; that is, absent constraining forces of law or other external regulation, markets will expand
to the frontiers of possibility, bounded only by (nontransaction) costs of production and consumer
preferences. See generally Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness ofPareto: Carrying Coase Further, 100
YALE L.L 1211, 1212 (1991) ("Transaction costs .... no less than existing technology, define what is
currently achievable in any society-the Pareto frontier. It follows that any given society is always or
will immediately arrive at a Pareto optimal point given transaction costs.'). This analysis also assumes
that markets will produce Pareto superior transactions, and thus will tend to maximize the range of
desirable goods available in the market according to individual utilities. Accordingly, inhibited only by
transactions costs and technology, any particular market should feature a range of transactions, including
some that maximize risk and some that minimize risk.
86. Courts have generally refused to permit parties to contract into performance remedies. See
Kronman, supra note 5, at 370-76 (suggesting judicial reluctance stems from unwillingness to constrain
personal freedom or incur administrative costs); cf Ian R. Macneil, Efficient Breach of Contract: Circles
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Rather, the point here is that the ability to discriminate on price and among
buyers or sellers is presumptively a good frequently desired by both buyers
and sellers, and thus the preformulated rule of performance will frequently
add an impediment to the fulfillment of the parties' intentions in forming
and executing contracts." Although the parties still might discriminate on
other aspects of the transaction, such as delivery date and risk of loss, one
common means of discrimination, and probably the cheapest to employ,
that is price, is rendered a more costly vehicle to accomplish contractual
intentions.
The second manner in which specific performance frustrates market
transactions, and thus impliedly hypothetical contractual intentions, relates
to and expands upon the first. Not only does performance serve to diminish
useful price discrimination among buyers and sellers, but it also tends to
curtail product variation and differentiation. Mandated performance tends
to eliminate high-risk transactions, such as the mechanic who fixes the
automobile off-hours for a cheaper price and lessened expectation of timely
and guaranteed performance. In this sense, the imposition of specific
performance has an effect on markets much like the imposition of a new
regulatory standard, serving to raise the price and standardize the product
across the market. The lower end of the market, characterized by discount
prices, substandard performance, and high risk of nondelivery, becomes less
available, and a number of voluntary transactions, at least those in which
the added cost of negotiating around the performance rule exceeds the gain
from the exchange, simply do not take place.88
Thus, it appears that the routine imposition of specific performance
presents an obstacle to market transactions. It requires that sellers, in the
in the Sky, 68 VA. L. REv. 947, 950-53 (1982) (arguing that the transaction costs of altering rules
should constitute the sole basis of comparing rules because performance is not less efficient than
damages, absent transaction costs). Bargaining from a performance obligation to a damages one is only
possible where there is a market providing ready and reasonable substitutes. See Goetz & Scott, supra
note 20, at 984-86.
87. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 20, at 971 ("Ideally, the preformulated rules supplied by the
state should mimic the agreements contracting parties would reach were they costlessly to bargain out
each detail of the transaction.'); cf Schwartz, supra note 5, at 286-87 (arguing that buyers and sellers
have similar postbreach advantages in obtaining alternate performances or finding alternative buyers).
But see Yorio, supra note 5, at 1382-85 (arguing that buyers have the postbreach advantage).
88. This may frequently be the case because the costs to the seller of negotiating around a rule
of mandated performance might be substantial. For example, the cost of altering a product or amending
a standard form agreement might be prohibitive for a volume seller, thus the preformulated rule of
specific performance would in fact become unalterable, despite the buyer's preference for bearing the
risk of nonperformance.
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above example, not discriminate among buyers, even where they might
prefer to do so and where the buyer might prefer to enjoy the discount in
price in exchange for that discrimination. In this way, a range of product
differentiation is lost. Of course, the flexibility that is lost with specific
performance can always be restored through a contractual provision for a
damages remedy. However, the point here is that specific performance, by
imposing a cost to achieving flexibility, tends to diminish variation in the
market. Because the more varied market that would be available in a
nonperformance regime is, by hypothesis, a product of contractual
intentions, then the imposition of the performance remedy actually hinders
or even defeats a range of contractual preferences. It is fundamentally
market-diminishing, not market-enhancing.
Although a preformulated rule of performance frustrates some market
outcomes due to transaction costs, by the same analysis the extant
preformulated rule of damages frustrates agreements where both buyer and
seller would prefer that seller bear the risk of nonperformance. As a result,
any preformulated rule is market diminishing to some extent. A
preformulated performance rule, however, would appear to pose a much
more serious obstacle to market transactions. The possible transactions in
a market may be divided into two categories. Category one is comprised
of those transactions where the costs of reaching agreement on the remedy
are smaller than the gain in assurance from resolving the choice of remedy
by agreement. Category two, conversely, is comprised of those transactions
where the costs of reaching agreement exceed the expected gain from
having a remedy specified in the contract. By hypothesis, the parties in
category one cases can agree to alter the default rule so that no transactions
are altered by an undesirable rule and the only harm incurred is the
increased transactions costs.89 The question then for rulemakers respecting
category one cases is whether, by adopting a preformulated damages
remedy, to encourage market transactions that allow parties the ability to
discriminate among buyers and to create products that vary by risk of
nonperformance.
In category two cases, however, the parties will not bargain around an
undesirable remedy, and must accept the default rule. If it is true, as argued
above, that specific performance generally tends to hinder a range of
"discount" or "risky" market transactions, then there is likely a coincidence
89. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960) (arguing that parties
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between the desirability, as a matter of contractual intention, of the
"discount" remedy of market-measure damages and category two cases.
Category two cases are defined as those where the profits from a transac-
tion are too small to justify altering the preformulated remedy. This same
limited potential for profit would probably tend to produce buyers and
sellers interested in minimizing all nonessential aspects of the bargain, with
the buyer, typically, bearing increased risk in exchange for price savings.
A mandatory rule of specific performance would unalterably shift this
element of risk to the seller, thus inhibiting contractual intentions.
Consequently, at best it appears that specific performance, in category one
cases, has either a neutral or harmful effect9 in hindering contractual
intentions, and at worst, in category two cases, it actually defeats them.
Thus, it would appear that a preformulated remedy of specific perfor-
mance would tend to diminish the range of market outcomes, and as a
consequence necessarily defeat a number of contractual intentions.
Although the remedy could, in many particular cases, actually vindicate the
unexpressed intentions of the parties in forming the contract, the remedy
generally does the opposite. Specific performance would likely frustrate
more intentions than it vindicated, if it is true that category two cases
predominantly feature buyers and sellers looking to minimize the cost of
the transaction.
3. Specific Performance as a Prohibitory Remedy
Specific performance is not necessarily a vindication of contractual
preference. To the contrary, it appears to diminish markets and frustrate the
expression of preferences. This analysis, however, by no means indicates
that the remedy is undesirable. Judges, as the issuers of this remedy, might
prefer to diminish the range of a market or to frustrate certain expressions
of contractual preference for very common and indeed classic reasons, such
as further deterring undesirable breach, fully compensating the victim, or
disgorging ill-gotten gains. These purposes form the traditional aims at
which prohibitory remedies are directed.
As in the case of injunctions, accomplishing the aims of specific
performance depends to a certain degree on sagacious judicial application.
For example, for a judge to employ the remedy of performance to ensure
90. Of course, whether the rule would hinder transactions in category one cases or not depends
on whether more aggregate costs are incurred in contracting around the performance remedy or around
the (present) damages remedy, which in turn depends, in part, on whether more parties are interested
in "discount' products than are interested in high-priced "guaranteed" products.
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full compensation to the victim of contractual breach, the judge must
determine that market damages do not adequately compensate plaintiff's
losses. This inquiry requires assessment of the value of plaintiff's losses,
the adequacy, price and availability of substitutes, the difficulty of
obtaining recovery,9' and the defendant's costs of compliance.92 Al-
though a judge might rely upon the plaintiff to provide much of the needed
information,93 thus issuing performance "automatically" upon the plaintiff
request, the plaintiff would obviously have an interest in overstating the
extent of his losses and understating the availability of adequate substitutes
and the cost of compliance. Plaintiff can be relied upon to request the more
favorable outcome; but what the plaintiff views as more favorable could be
the product of vindictiveness, a desire to create general deterrence against
contractees breaching against the plaintiff, or the simple desire to gain more
than that for which plaintiff bargained.94
Even assuming, however, that in many or most cases it is reasonable for
the court to rely on plaintiff's specification of the more adequate remedy,
the plaintiff's task may not be simple: accurate information is costly, and
it may be difficult for a business of even moderate size to determine lost
profits or reliance costs flowing from particular events, adequacy and
availability of market substitutes, and burdens on the defendant. Even with
perfect information, moreover, several questions of close judgment remain,
such as which damages are to be included as proximately caused by the
91. See YoO, supra note 84, § 2.4 (discussing the availability of substitutes on the market and
the ability to assess damages with reasonable certainty).
92. Defendant's burdens matter because courts are reluctant to impose specific performance in
personal services contracts. See id. § 15.2 ("An order to perform a service may subject the promisor
to a form of involuntary servitude or force the parties to maintain a noxious personal relationship.").
93. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 277 ("[P]romisees generally know more about their promisors
than do courts; thus they are in a better position to predict whether specific performance decrees would
induce their promisors to render satisfactory performances.').
94. See Yorio, supra note 5, at 1373 (examining the promisee's potential motives). A plaintiff who
is awarded specific performance might gain more than that for which he bargained in cases where: (1)
the parties intended loss-based damages to be the available remedy, with price adjusted accordingly;
(2) the course of dealing in the particular industry, of which plaintiff was aware and took advantage,
impliedly created that intention, and thus provided the unspoken background to the contractual price;
(3) the parties never considered the remedy, and the industry or market provided none, and the contract
price was insufficient to place the risk of nonperformance on the seller, (4) the market price for the
exchanged good has decreased, but plaintiff vindictively refuses market substitution of the good on
fictitious claims of incompatibility of the substitute; or (5) the market price for the exchanged good has
increased but defendant failed to deliver due to impossibility, and plaintiff vindictively refuses to cover
based on fictitious incompatibility.
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breach,95 what degree of cross-elasticity is sufficient for a plaintiff to
conclude a substitute is "adequate," 96 and what sort of contract, for
example, is sufficiently "personal" to engender concerns over perfor-
mance.
9 7
Using specific performance to fulfill plaintiff's preference for full
compensation presents the easiest task. More problematic is the use of the
remedy to add to the deterrent effect of market damages, or to disgorge
gains.9" Aiming at either of these goals requires estimates of the gains and
losses of the defendant; unlike the plaintiff, the defendant has no incentive
to specify that his gains, for example, exceed the plaintiff's losses. In
addition, even with perfect information, the judge must still make multiple
difficult judgments about the nature and extent of defendant's gains, their
relationship to the breach, and the difficulty that performance might
impose, just as the judge must do in regard to loss-based damages.
4. Summary
At bottom, specific performance governs behavior by coercion.99 It
represents the judicial imposition of a prescribed outcome. Although
specific performance may frequently be ordered consistent with implied
contractual preferences, and may also frequently be ordered in contradiction
to actual but unexpressed contractual preferences, performance fundamen-
tally operates to defeat markets. Unlike damages, performance is not market
enhancing, but instead is market diminishing, and tends to work, in cases
where it cannot be bargained around, to frustrate contractual preferenc-
es. 10
Given the market-defeating nature of specific performance, courts should
employ it carefully. Unfortunately, the very difficulty of its effective
employment might preclude careful application. Its employment as a
defendant-focused remedy, to create deterrence or to disgorge profits,
requires the judge to learn and assess a great deal of information about the
defendant. Even in its simpler task as a provider of fuller compensation to
95. The problem for plaintiff in apportioning damages can be especially difficult in multiple-
defendant cases. See, e.g., Kingston v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 211 N.W. 913 (Wis. 1927) (meting out
liability for acts arising from partially unknown sources).
96. This problem is explored in Kronman, supra note 5, at 358-65.
97. See generally 3 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 12.8(3) (discussing "personal services" contracts).
98. The feasibility of using specific performance and other prohibitory remedies to achieve these
goals will be discussed below. See infra notes 130-91 and accompanying text.
99. See YoRio, supra note 84, § 1.2.2.
100. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
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the plaintiff, specific performance demands that a judge make a difficult
determination about the plaintiff's needs, and the adequacy and cost of
substitute performance, and even of the availability of markets to supply
that substitute. This is not to argue that specific performance can never be
effectively employed to increase deterrence or to ensure full compensation;
more significant is understanding the difficulty and costs involved in using
performance to accomplish any of these purposes. Like the injunction,
specific performance is a prohibitory remedy, and its effective employment
relies on the judge, not the market.
D. Restitution
Restitution appears in many guises,"0' and is not susceptible to easy
definition.10 2 Nevertheless, in a general sense restitution seeks to disgorge
defendant's gains, or in cases of quasi-contract, at least so much of it as to
meet the market price for plaintiff's improvement. 3 It is difficult to
characterize restitution as a prohibitory remedy that is fundamentally
opposed to damages. Unlike injunctions and specific performance, it shares
an essential attribute with damages in that it frequently is substitutionary.
Moreover, it is conceptually the "mirror image" of tort, a quintessential
damages remedy." Nevertheless, restitution is prohibitory because it
shares the "public" character of the injunction and specific performance.
1. Tort Versus Restitution
It seems plausible to say that restitution works just like tort, only in
reverse: where tort may be understood as a fictitious contract devised by
a judge to remedy non-bargained-for harms, so restitution may be
understood as a fictitious contract devised by a judge to account for non-
101. Restitution may consist of a money payment representing defendant's gain, or may consist of
a form of"specific restitution" of the thing itself. Remedies that may provide specific restitution include
the constructive trust, rescission, replevin, and ejeetment. The equitable lien is a hybrid because it
combines a money remedy with a lien on the thing itself. Douglas Laycock, The Scope and Signtficance
of Restitution, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1277, 1290 (1989).
102. See generally Friedmann, supra note 5, at 504-05 (outlining the "underlying principles" of
restitution).
103. Although restitutionary remedies arise fromjudicial prescription, they can be flexibly fashioned
either to replicate a market transaction or to obviate one. See RESTATEMENT OF RESTIuION ch. 8,
topic 2, introductory note at 595-96 (1936). Historically, cases based on the common law writs sought
a market-based measure, such as quasi-contract, implicitly awarding restitutionary damages at the price
the parties would have entered an agreement.
104. Saul X. Levmore, Explaining Restitution, 71 VA. L. REV. 65, 67 (1985) (referring to restitution
as "[l]ocated at the intersection of tort and contract law').
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bargained-for benefits." 5 Indeed, restitution and tort appear to be so much
the mirror image of each other, at least conceptually, that it seems nearly
impossible to account for the fact that tort remedies are available in a far
broader set of cases and with much greater frequency."°
But only in these most abstract terms are tort and restitution alike. Tort
damages, at least in the business context, encourage wealth production, the
fundamental aim of market transactions, while restitution frequently does
not, and is simply redistributive. In tort, when the defendant converts a
plaintiff's property interest, for example, he does so with the expectation
of employing that interest more profitably in some other use, or otherwise
profiting from the harm.'0 7 The defendant has committed a tort for the
sake of producing wealth. The plaintiff in a restitution case, for example a
case involving a mistaken improvement, has also harmed (himself) for the
105. Id.
106. Professor Levmore suggests that restitution is employed less frequently than tort because
restitution, unlike tort, hinders "market encouragement," presents difficult problems of "valuation," and
is subject to "wealth dependency." Id. at 68-82. Both tort and restitution, however, tend to hinder
"market encouragement." By allowing people to "take and pay" in tort and to "benefit and collect" in
restitution, each remedy tends to create "thin markets," because neither the tortfeasor nor the benefit-
doer must bargain prior to acting. Similarly, problems of "valuation" do not appear to be more difficult
in regard to the measure of a gain than they do a loss: both problems involve issues of tracing,
proximate causation, and other imprecise judgments. Finally, the problem of "wealth dependency" seems
inadequate to explain the asymmetry. Although restitution might be disfavored because it allows one
party to force a benefit on another that is subjectively valued at less than the market price, so then
should tort's take-and-pay system be disfavored because it allows one party to forcibly take the property
of another that the other (the plaintiff) might value at more than the market price, yet pay only the
market price. Both tort damages and restitution in the mistaken benefit case destroy idiosyncratic values.
Of course, the concept of wealth dependency does help explain why the goal of protecting idiosyncratic
valuations tends to lead to the denial of restitution (thus not compelling a defendant to "purchase" an
unwanted product) and to the award of tort damages as a "half-way" measure to full protection (giving
plaintiff part of plaintiff's lost idiosyncratic valuations, to the extent of market value).
Even the limited explanatory power of "wealth dependency," however, is subject to the substantial
objection that the point is circular. In restitution, the defendant wins because his idiosyncratic valuations
must be protected. In tort, the defendant loses because the plaintiff's idiosyncratic valuations must be
protected. Why is it not the other way? In extending a benefit, the plaintiff in a restitution case may
have incurred idiosyncratic costs, such as the loss of a homestead to stave off a community flood: the
denial of restitution overrides the plaintiff's "wealth dependency." Similarly, the defendant in a tort
action may have, by erecting an antenna that impinges on the plaintiff's view, converted property that
he values below the market price: the award of market-priced damages for the lost view overrides the
defendant's idiosyncratic tastes. Thus, a priori, the notion of "wealth dependency" fails to explain case
outcomes: it only appears useful after the court has decided which party's idiosyncratic valuations to
protect.
107. See, e.g., Olwell v. Nye & Nissen, 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946) (awarding restitution of
defendant's profits where defendant converted and profitably put to use plaintiff's unused egg-washing
machine).
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sake of producing wealth, which he hopes to collect from the defendant.
But the restitution defendant may not value the improvement at market
price, but at something less; or, the defendant may have more profitable
methods of using his money. If the improvement is not easily resold, then
requiring the defendant to pay restitution will not maximize the production
of wealth.
This point requires that utility and wealth be distinguished.' Utility
is subjective and personally valuable: it reflects the value one places on a
good, and is conceptually independent of market price. Wealth is objective
and both socially and personally valuable: it reflects one's net worth, which
is the sum of dollars one could obtain in exchange for liquidation. In
theory, all voluntary transactions should effect an increase in utility; they
may not all increase wealth, as one might "overpay" for a sentimental item,
such as an heirloom, whose nonsentimental market or replacement value is
much less. Nevertheless, because individuals enter transactions to increase
utility, society must encourage the maximization of utility to enjoy the
derivative production of wealth from transactions. Thus, it should not
surprise that the common law, with its noted solicitude for a capitalist
economy,'0 9 has favored remedies that promote utility maximizing, and
further favors transactions where utility-maximizing produces social wealth
over those where it does not.'10
Both harms by defendants (tort) and benefits by plaintiffs (restitution)
can maximize the defendant's utility, but only in tort is it certain to be
maximized, simply because the defendant knows if his preferences exceed
market price. In restitution, the plaintiff may predict that the defendant's
utility will exceed the market price of the improvement, for example, but
cannot be certain. If the defendant's utility is below market price and the
plaintiff's benefit cannot be resold, or if the defendant had more profitable
options, then restitution does not promise to maximize utility. Thus, the
common law's embrace of tort and relative rejection of restitution is
predictable given a preference for utility maximization and its derivative
108. See Gary Lawson, Efficiency and Individualism, 42 DUKE L. 53, 64-65, 92-96 (1992)
(distinguishing between utility and welfare, the latter term to include wealth); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
PROBLEMS OF JuRISPRUDENCE 356 (1990) (explaining how utility-maximizing produces wealth).
109. See Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1216 ("All in all, our system of legal remedies for breach of
contract, heavily influenced by the economic philosophy of free enterprise, has shown a marked
solicitude for men who do not keep their promises.").
110. This latter point is developed infra notes 248-57 and accompanying text.
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wealth creation.'
In the other variety of restitution cases, where defendant has tortiously
converted and profited from an interest of the plaintiff, restitution seeks to
penalize transactions that are profitable, both in terms of utility and wealth.
Here the situation is identical to the (presumptively desired) one created by
tort damages, so it would seem desirable that the courts employ restitution
infrequently in these cases, relegating plaintiffs to tort, or awarding
restitution but limiting plaintiff's recovery to a measure of damages equal
to tort damages."1
2
Therefore, it is unsurprising that the common law favored tort remedies
but disfavored restitution, despite their beguiling conceptual similarity. Tort
mirrors everyday market transactions in the sense that a willing buyer, the
defendant, acts to maximize his utility and in doing so effectively adds to
the aggregate of social wealth."' Restitution, on the other hand, consti-
tutes the seller (the plaintiff) foisting the good on the unwilling buyer,
regardless of utility. Although wealth would be produced in cases where
defendant's utility exceeds market price or where it does not but defendant
can easily resell the good, wealth would not be maximized, and the
maximization of wealth is a goal different from simple wealth production.
11I. Of course, tortious conversions too may sometimes fail to maximize wealth: a defendant could
steal plaintiff's heirloom to enjoy idiosyncratic utilities much as did plaintiff, and so the common law
may at times reject tortious profiting, resorting to restitution to separate defendants who maximize utility
only from those who also maximize wealth. This point will be elaborated upon below. See infra notes
291-306 and accompanying text. Conversely, in improvement cases, although certainly the improvement,
if it truly is one, will ineluctably increase social wealth, it may not maximize it, for defendant may have
had better investment options. The improvement may not marry utility with wealth where defendant
disprefers the improvement.
112. In practice, however, it is not clear whether the measure of restitution in cases involving
tortious conduct limit plaintiff's recovery to the equivalent of damages, or allow recovery of profits as
well. Dobbs reports that courts permit the greater recovery. 1 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 4.1(1), at 553-54.
But see RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION ch. 8, topic 2, introductory note at 595-96 ("[The measure of
restitution is determined with reference to the tortiousness of the defendant's conduct or the negligence
or other fault of one or both of the parties .... If the defendant was tortious in his acquisition of the
benefit he is required to pay for what the other has lost although that is more than the recipient
benefitted. If he was consciously tortious in acquiring the benefit, he is also deprived of any profit
derived from his subsequent dealing with it.'); Ramona Manor Convalescent Hosp. v. Care Enters., 225
Cal Rptr. 120 (Ct. App. 1986) (quoting the Restatement of Restitution for proposition that the
availability of restitution arising from tortious conduct "has not yet crystallized into a rule since ... it
is only in certain types of situations that restitution is permitted... [wherein there are] imperfections
in the tort remedies," and finding the tort remedy adequate). Professor Laycock reports that the rules
are indeterminate. Laycock, supra note 101, at 1288-89 (describing the degree of culpability as the most
important factor).
113. An elaboration on the way in which wealth is generated by utility maximization is set forth
below. See infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text.
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2. Restitution as a Prohibitory Remedy
When a judge is confronted with a claim for restitution, the judge must
decide whether to create an obligation where the market itself did not
produce one. Unlike tort, however, when a judge writes a "restitution
contract," the judge is not mimicking market transactions, although
restitution may frequently replicate the market price. Restitution allows the
seller, in a case of mistaken improvement, for example, to force a sale, and
thus terminates the buyer's ability and incentive to seek profitable
transactions to maximize his utility. Essentially, the difference between tort
and restitution in this case reduces to whether the law would prefer the
buyer or the seller to decide what is best for the buyer. The market system
has always left that decision to the buyer; restitution supplants and reverses
this salient market practice.
Restitution supplants market practices by judicial prohibition. Unlike the
injunction or specific performance, however, the judge in awarding
restitutionary damages does not appear to face significant impediments, at
least none greater than those apparent in awarding the common alternative,
tort or contract damages. All these measures of damages require difficult
judgments about value and proximate cause; the frequent availability of the
jury in the tort case is important, but only in the sense that it relocates
some of the difficulty of measurement, rather than eliminating it. Moreover,
it does not appear that "gai" is more difficult to measure than "loss.....4
Although restitution does not appear to present particular difficulties in
application, it does permit case outcomes that are decidedly different than
those that would be produced by the "market" remedies of tort and contract
damages.'15 To understand this point in the broad context of restitution,
it is useful to divide restitutionary cases, albeit somewhat imprecisely, into
three categories: cases involving mistaken benefits, cases involving
voluntary benefits, and cases involving benefits generated by tortious
114. But see Ulen, supra note 5, at 356-57 (asserting that, "in general, it is extremely inexpensive
to measure damages in terms of benefit conferred, especially in comparison to the other damage
measures available to the courts"). However, in one instance where a lawmaking body was required to
define gain and loss, the resulting definitions appear similar. UNITED STATES SENTENCINO COMMISSION,
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8A1.2(h) (1993) [hereinafter US.S.G.] (defining "pecuniary gain," a subset of
restitution's "gain," in part as "the additional before-tax profit to the defendant resulting from the
relevant conduct of the offense"); 1d. § 2B1.1 (defining "loss" in part to mean "the value of the property
taken, damaged, or destroyed").
115. See Laycock, supra note 101, at 1287-88 (noting the differences among remedial approaches
where defendant's gain and plaintiff's loss differ).
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conduct."'6 In each area, the question for the court is whether or not to
create a legal duty where one did not exist by virtue of private contract. An
example from each category of restitution will make the prohibitory nature
of restitutionary remedies clear.
In the category of mistaken benefit cases, assume that a contractor has
a contract to build a new deck on house A, but has mistakenly built it on
house B. Courts disagree on whether or not the owner of house B must
restitute the market value of the deck to the contractor,'17 but a court that
decides to require payment for the mistaken improvement creates an
obligation, ex post, that specifically requires B to purchase a deck. B's only
option in this instance, assuming his funds are devoted to preferable uses,
is to sell the home or some other item to allow for the payment. By forcing
this purchase, the judge's ruling has supplanted B's ability to exercise his
market preferences. Although requiring restitution appears plausible in cases
where the benefit involves a mistaken payment of money or involves an
item easily removed and sold,' its use in situations where the improve-
ment cannot easily be removed and sold at market price connotes a
substantial displacement of the market outcome." 9 Specifically, the
plaintiff in this case has provided himself no remedy by contracting with
116. DAVID SCHOENBROD ET AL., REMEDIES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 543-45 (1990) (describing the
three categories).
117. Levmore, supra note 104, at 84-87 (noting that the general rule denies restitution to a
nonbargaining improver of property, but noting an emerging trend to the contrary in regard to real
property).
118. Id. at 77-78 ("[R]estitution need not be denied where the nonbargained benefit is easily
translated into wealth. The recipient then has no claim that the benefit is worthless to him.").
119. An interesting case where restitution in a mistaken improvement case makes sense, from an
economic perspective, is Kossian v. American National Insurance Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App.
1967). There, the plaintiff contracted with the owner of an inn to remove debris following a fire. Prior
to performance the owner went bankrupt and transferred the interest in the property to defendant, who
held a deed of trust and had obtained fire insurance. Unbeknownst to the defendant, plaintiff performed
after the title transfer. Defendant's claim to his insurer included costs of debris removal, and plaintiff
sued defendant for the market value of its services. The court held that, although it would ordinarily
deny restitution in cases involving mistaken improvement, it would grant it here because the defendant
had collected for the improvement from the insurance company. Kossian thus suggests that where the
mistaken improvement is either in money or in a form where a functioning market renders translation
of the improvement to money quite easy, or here, where the improvement had already been "sold," in
effect, to the insurance company, restitution makes sense. Of course, the holding that a collection from
an insurer constitutes an "unjust" enrichment is problematic in light of the "justness" of the prohibition
established by the collateral source rule against tort defendants' set-off of plaintiff's insurance proceeds.
For a discussion of the collateral source rule, see generally John L. Antracoli, Note, California 's
Collateral Source Rule and Plaintiff's Receipt of Uninsured Motorist Benefits, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 667,
669-72 (1986).
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the defendant, and has no claim that the defendant has acted tortiously
toward him. His harm-based damages remedy is zero; restitution constitutes
a judicial remedy prescribing an outcome where the market provided none.
Similar anti-market effects are evident with regard to the possibility of
restitutionary remedies in cases in the other two categories. In a case
involving a voluntary conferral of a benefit, a decision permitting
restitution supplies a remedy where the parties, either because of emergen-
cy, fraud or mistake, failed to provide for one on their own. For example,
assume a buyer purchases a home having latent environmental problems
known to the seller. 2 After discovery of the fraud, the buyer's action for
rescission of the contract, essentially a restitutionary remedy for return of
the purchase price, abrogates the market transaction of the parties and
prescribes an obligation to undo a prior contract. This is not to say that the
fraud should go unremedied. Rather, the choice is whether to relegate the
fraud victim to a damages remedy, here comprised of the difference in
Vxalue of the home arising from the fraud and thus requiring the plaintiff to
sell the property should he not wish to live in an unsafe home, or to award
the plaintiff a supra-market remedy by judicial prohibition. The anti-market
effects here are evident: the seller's legitimate gain, of which the illicit gain
from the fraud is a subpart, is either transferred to the buyer through
rescission of the price, or to the extent that seller's (utility) gain exceeded
the market price, is irretrievably lost.
Finally, in a case involving a tortious conferral of a benefit, the issue is
again whether to relegate the plaintiff to a harm-based remedy, typically
constituting the rental value of the item tortiously converted, or to award
disgorgement of the defendant's profits."' The harm-based remedy seeks
to put the plaintiff in the position he would have been in had the item been
purchased by defendant in a voluntary market transaction; the restitutionary
remedy reflects the judge's decision, usually for reasons of deterring
tortious conduct, to deny the defendant his profits from the tort. 2 2 This
120. See, e.g., Hutchison v. Pyburn, 567 S.W.2d 762 (Tenn. App. 1977). Rescission will frequently
appear more desirable to plaintiffs than harm-based damages. Id. (holding that rescission entitles
plaintiff who was buyer of home with defective sewer system to refund of purchase price).
121. See, e.g., Olwell v. Nye & Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946) (allowing restitution of
defendant's profits because defendant was consciously tortious).
122. Plaintiff's claim for disgorgement can be justified in several ways. First, plaintiff can claim
that he would have profited from a retention of the wrongfully converted item; thus defendant's
disgorgement simply serves as a rough proxy for plaintiff's losses. See Ramona Manor Convalescent
Hosp. v. Care Enters., 225 Cal. Rptr. 120 (Ct. App. 1986) (holding that because plaintiff could not show
lost profits with certainty, it was appropriate to use defendant's actual profits as measure). Second,
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motive to deny tortious gains operates in direct contradiction to the usual
role of damages in a tort case, which is to permit defendants to "take and
pay" tortiously where it appears profitable to do so.
3. Summary
Despite its substitutionary character and its conceptual similarity to tort,
restitution has always been employed far less frequently at common law
than the traditional tort remedy. Because utility differs from wealth,
maximization of the former is necessary to produce the latter. Restitution
does not promise to create wealth, but merely to redistribute it, precisely
because it does not promote utility maximization, and thus fails to mirror
a voluntary market transaction. When restitution is employed, moreover, its
outcomes differ markedly from those that would obtain by virtue of the
market-oriented remedies, forcing defendants, depending on the case, to pay
for unwanted products, to disgorge lawfully acquired gains, or to be
unusually penalized for employing the customary "take and pay."
E. Other Instances of Prohibition
Market-oriented outcomes are frustrated or reversed in a variety of ways
other than through the use of the remedies of injunctions, specific
performance, and restitution. These other methods appear less directed
toward reversing a market result, but their effect is indistinguishable from
other prohibitory remedies, and they will be listed briefly here for the sake
of completeness and to facilitate later discussion."
plaintiff's claim might reflect the gains of trade plaintiff would have reaped had defendant chosen to
negotiate rather than take. See Schwartz, supra note 5, at 275-76 (exploring difficulties buyer might
have in locating a suitable substitute in the contractual context). Third, the restitutionary measure might
constitute a crude attempt to compensate plaintiff for his idiosyncratic losses. Allowing plaintiff to use
defendant's profit as a rough proxy for these items, however, creates a great risk of holding the
defendant liable for more than the defendant would have paid in a market, and potentially penalizes the
defendant disproportionately. Dale A. Oesterle, Deficiencies of the Restitutionary Right to Trace
Misappropriated Property in Equity and in UCC § 9-306, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 172 (1983) (arguing
that ignoring causation in tracing gains threatens to take from defendant just as well as unjust gains).
123. Although they are not the product of judicial prescription, many legislated rules, particularly
countermajoritarian statutes, are prohibitory in character, responding to perceived failures in market
outcomes. Legislative prescription usually takes the form of instructions, to judges or other
decisionmakers, as to the manner of deciding cases, for example precluding a court, when it "balances"
the interests of the parties in deciding whether or not to award an injunction, from considering certain
harms to the defendant As a result, a law prohibiting discrimination towards a person with a disease
such as AIDS precludes a court, when "balancing," to include the defendant's fears or other feelings
about the virus. Chalk v. United States District Court, 840 F.2d 701, 711 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that
in applying anti-discrimination statute, it was impermissible for the court's decision to be informed by
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1. The Exclusionary Rule
By design, criminal sanctions are prohibitory, because their severity and
intrusiveness renders them beyond the "take and pay" calculus. 24 Apart
from sentences, the most salient example of judicial prohibition in the
criminal arena is the exclusionary rule for constitutional violations, a
remedy that is essentially a method of disgorging or restituting the gains
made by police officers who search or interrogate illegally."z Its adoption
represents an explicit rejection of the efficacy of a damages remedy based
on the harm suffered by the suspect. 26
2. Prophylactic Rules
Most broadly, the recent proclivity for prohibition has been directed at
the judiciary itself. The common law method of fact-intensive, case-by-case
community fear, parental pressure, and the possibility of law suits).
Despite some early animosity to Congress' efforts at structuring judicial balancing, Hecht Co. v.
Bowles, 321, 330 U.S. 321 (1944) (refusing to interpret Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 to limit
judicial discretion), the Supreme Court has apparently reconciled itself to adhering to congressional
prerogatives in balancing interests. See Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)
(adhering to perceived congressional striking of the balance in the Endangered Species Act); Weinberger
v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 316 (1982) (finding that congressional priorities did not mandate an
injunction). The recent trend toward criminalizing an increasing range of economic business behavior
formerly subject to tort remedies implies a similar legislative impatience with loss-based remedies. See
generally Coffee, supra note 17 (examining the "blurring of the border between tort and crime'). The
use of the criminal law as a regulatory device, particularly in the area of corporate crime, see Jeffrey
Standen, Prolegomenon to Corporate Punishment, in CORPORATE SENTENCrNa: THE GUIDELINES TAKE
HOLD (Roger Pilon & John R. Lott, Jr., eds., forthcoming 1995); John C. Coffee, Jr., Hushl: The
Criminal Status of Confidential Information After McNally and Carpenter and the Enduring Problem
of Overcriminalization, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 121 (1988), also evidences a desire to govern traditional
economic activity through sanctions not subject to a take-and-pay decision. See generally HMEDRT
PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968).
124. See Coffee, supra note 17, at 194 ("[There cannot be an 'optimal' rule of crime that is to be
attained by pricing the subject behavior.'). Despite this implicit hope that criminal sanctions are so
severe that no one would "monetize" them, Congress has perhaps wisely supposed that lawbreakers
might not be deterred by the prospect of spending time in modem prisons. The federal sentencing
guidelines, at many instances, provide that the sentencing judge may order disgorgement of the greater
of the defendant's gain or loss. See, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 8C2.4. This provision can only suggest legislative
anticipation of the possibility that the criminal defendant might "take and pay" where expected profits
exceed losses, even where those losses appear in the form of criminal sanctions.
125. See Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 28, at 490 (describing exclusion as restitutionary because
it "requires the government to give up its gains'); see also Laycock, supra note 101, at 1280-81
(discussing specific restitution of a particular thing as a subset of restitution).
126. Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 28, at 490; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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adjudication contemplates a slowly evolving "market" for legal rules. 27
The existence of any market implies a certain tolerance for bad decisions
made by consumers who misjudge the value of products, or sellers who
undervalue them. Similarly, in the market for judicial decisions, the
possibility of rule by case precedent is limited by the different set of facts
each successive case presents, thus allowing room for a mistaken distinction
of precedent and a concomitant toleration for risk.
At numerous junctures, the "market" for common law decisions has been
abolished by superior courts, especially the U.S. Supreme Court, in favor
of rules that prescribe outcomes. These prohibitory rules, more commonly
termed "prophylactic" rules, attempt to lessen the risk of bad decisions by
lower courts.'
HI. THE FAILURE OF PROHIBITORY REMEDIES
Prohibitory remedies comprise the alternative to the legal system's
preference for remedies that price, and thus earn the repeated praise of
those who regard damages as inadequate or undesirable.' 29 These critics
claim that prohibitory remedies, unlike pricing remedies, would achieve
perfect compensation, produce efficiency and wealth gains, and provide
greater deterrence against undesirable activity. This Part explores the
claimed superiority of prohibitory remedies at achieving these goals. It
ultimately concludes that a legal system that favors prohibitory remedies
promises, at best, to do no better than damages remedies and may, at worst,
actually tend to frustrate remedial objectives.
A. Prohibitory Remedies Fail to Minimize Risk
This subpart explores the claim that prohibitory remedies better reduce
the incidence of harm. 3 Prohibitory remedies create deterrence by virtue
of the large penalty that they represent to defendants. Restitution, for
127. Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 611-16
(1992).
128. The Court announced its most famous prophylactic constitutional rule in Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966) (avoiding case-by-case inquiry because of "[t]he difficulty in depicting what
transpires at [modem] interrogations"). See also United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 227 (1967)
(holding that defense counsel must be present at a lineup in order to minimize subtle coercions).
129. See supra note 5.
130. See, e.g., Kronman, supra note 5, at 380 ("Since it eliminates any profit the promisor might
make by selling the property to someone other than his original promisee, imposition of a constructive
trust should greatly weaken the promisor's incentive to breach the original contract without having first
negotiated a release.").
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example, requires defendants to remit gain and thus should deter defendants
from tortiously seeking a benefit even where they perceive that the gain
will be greater than the anticipated harm-based damages.' Similarly, an
award of specific performance provides relief more costly to the defendant
than expectation damages, thus taking away defendant's gain and his
motivation for the breach."3 At bottom, these prohibitory remedies
attempt to deter a party from treating the relevant property or personal
interest as subject to the take-and-pay system.
Although prohibitory remedies may provide greater deterrence in
particular cases, it remains doubtful whether the increasing employment of
prohibitory remedies would effect an overall increase in deterrence over
that already provided by market damages. Prohibitory remedies do not
promise to decrease harmful behavior because they are clumsy instruments,
and because they have unpredictable and, at times, undesirable effects.
Indeed, the undesirable effects engendered by prohibitory remedies may
actually tend, perversely, to encourage risk-seeking and harm-generating
behavior in contexts where such behavior is socially undesirable.
1. The Clumsiness of Prohibitory Remedies
In order for a particular prohibitory remedy to increase the deterrence
above that created by a market-based remedy, it should be amenable to
precise use. Unfortunately, the available remedies, in most cases, appear
imprecise and unwieldy, as was discussed in Part II."' Even when judges
are able to overcome the substantial information and other costs attendant
to the employment of prohibitory remedies, however, the remedies remain
poor vehicles to effect deterrence. In other words, prohibitory remedies,
even when perfectly arrayed by an experienced judge, will not likely deter
undesirable conduct any more than does a market-based remedial system.
(a) Example: The Remedy of Exclusion
Consider the following two cases involving the restitutionary remedy of
exclusion.'34 Case One is a criminal case where the police have forcibly
131. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 6, § 4.8 (outlining possible economic motivations of breaching
party).
132. See, e.g., id. § 4.11.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 54-75, 91-98, 114.
134. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text (describing the exclusionary rule). Although
the underlying case in which the remedy of exclusion is criminal, the remedy itself is civil, instituted
in place of adamages remedy in order to deterpolice risconduct by restituting the gain from the illegal
police action. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
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entered the personal residence of a criminal suspect without a warrant and
have engaged in a broad, intrusive and damaging search. The only evidence
produced from this unconstitutional search is a shotgun shell traceable to
the murder weapon. It happens that the police have already found in other
places nine other such shells, of identical evidentiary value in implicating
the suspect, pursuant to legal investigative techniques. The defendant's
primary remedial tool to redress the harm from the illegal search is the
exclusion from evidence of the tenth shell: a remedy that is trivial in
comparison to the harm resulting from the invasion of his home. 35
Moreover, this trivial remedy of exclusion does little to deter unlawful
police behavior.
Now consider Case Two, where the police use an incorrect warrant form
for an otherwise valid search, and in the course of that search uncover
important evidence used to convict the defendant of murder. 36 Here, the
exclusion of the evidence potentially allows the murderer to go free, a
result in great disproportion to the damage caused the defendant by the
invasion of his constitutional interest, an invasion that would probably be
compensated in a small measure of harm-based damages by a jury.3 7 In
Case Two, the remedy of exclusion provides defendant with a substantial
windfall, and leaves the community with the discomforting feeling that a
very small marginal gain in deterrence of wrongful police conduct has been
bought at a very high price.
38
135. The defendant may have other legal remedies, including most notably a civil suit against state
officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988), or against federal officials pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Tort remedies, however, appear
to be inadequate in this context for a variety of reasons, including that the amount of damages would
be too small to justify undertaking the expense of a suit. See Caleb Foote, Tort Remedies for Police
Violations ofIndividual Rights, 39 MINN. L. REv. 493, 500 (1955) ("It is not surprising that attorneys
are reluctant to take [such] cases because of the small chances of a recovery 'sufficient to justify the
action .... "').
136. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984) (declining to reverse lower court on
finding of invalidity of warrant, but applying a "good faith" exception to rule of exclusion).
137. Another example of a Case Two situation is seen in Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977),
where a conversation in the course of a lawful transport of a murder suspect between police stations
induced the suspect to identify the location ofthe murder weapon, thus implicating himself in a heinous
crime. Id. at 392-93. The conversation was later adjudged to constitute an impermissible interrogation,
despite the absence of any coercion, and the evidence was excluded. Id. at 401.
138. It is easy to find cases where the harm caused a defendant appears minute, but the remedy of
disgorgement appears a disproportionate windfall. See supra note 136; see also Levmore & Stuntz,
supra note 28, at 490-95 (suggesting that the rule of exclusion provides the defendant a gain beyond
that equal to the prosecution's disgorgement where evidence is excluded when the evidence would have
been inevitably discovered in fact, but was not "inevitably discovered" for constitutional purposes). It
is harder to find, yet easy to imagine, cases where the value of the disgorgement to the defendant is
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The controversial history of the exclusionary rule testifies to its
clumsiness. 139 Exclusion does not, and indeed cannot, take into account
the relative value of the interests at stake, or the particular desirability of
its exercise in a certain context. It creates a boon or a bust. Exclusion is
purposely insensitive to harm, and thus predictably has engendered
controversial and, at times, indefensible results, or at least results that can
only be defended by appeals to higher orderings of the social good, in Case
Two cases, or by appeals to the costliness of remedies, in Case One cases.
The results cannot be defended by reference to the harm at issue.
This insensitivity to harm renders prohibitory remedies particularly inapt
to effect deterrence. Whether prohibitory remedies increase or actually
decrease deterrence in comparison to the alternative pricing remedy
depends on the frequency of the occurrence of types of cases, which may
be somewhat random. For example, in order for an actual increase in the
deterrence of unlawful police behavior to occur by virtue of the remedy of
exclusion, then the harm to police or enforcement interests from the
exclusionary remedy must be greater, on average, than the comparative
harm of paying damages. In other words, simply as a matter of definition,
for deterrence to increase it must "cost" police more to lose evidence than
they "gain" by making illegal searches, and this cost must exceed the
hypothetical cost to them of harm-based damages.
It is not necessarily true that the cost of exclusion should exceed the gain
from searching. If cases like Case One, where the exclusionary remedy is
of trivial value to the defendant and to the system in comparison to the
harm, occur with more frequency than do cases like Case Two, where the
remedy of exclusion divests the government of a substantial gain in the
wake of a trivial or small harm, then exclusion probably costs less than the
trivial in comparison to the harm caused by wrongful police activity. See supra note 135. Congress has
provided liquidated damages for certain illegal searches to overcome this problem. 18 U.S.C. § 2520
(1988) (mandating that most victims of unauthorized wiretap to receive greater of actual damages or
not less than $100 per day of invasion or $10,000).
139. The controversy continues. Yale Kamisar, Does (Did) (Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on
a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Proposition"?, 16 CREIGHTON L. REv. 565 (1983).
Professor Kamisar's "principled basis" has not been adopted in federal courts. In United States v. Leon,
468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984), the Supreme Court stated:
The Fourth Amendment contains no provision expressly precluding the use of evidence
obtained in violation of its commands, and an examination of its origin and purposes makes
clear that the use of fruits of a past unlawful search or seizure "work[s] no new Fourth
Amendment wrong." ... [The exclusionary rule] operates as a "judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its deterrent effect, rather
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gain it is designed to preclude. Indeed, it may well be that, in fact, Case
One cases outnumber Case Two cases, as much police activity is undertak-
en without an evidence-gathering motive, thus actually encouraging police
to cause great harm without concern over the effects of exclusion.
Thus, the proposition that the exclusionary remedy accomplishes greater
deterrence of unlawful police behavior than does harm-based damages
strangely relies on the hope that a sufficient number of wildly "unjust"
Case Two cases, where exclusion appears a great windfall to the defendant,
occur to offset and surpass the incidence and gain of Case One cases,
which involve police harms that go unremedied. It is entirely possible that
Case Two cases do not arise with sufficient frequency to pose a large
deterrent,"4 especially in comparison with the putatively large number of
Case One cases.' If so, judicial reliance on the exclusionary rule as a
means to increase deterrence has been misplaced. In the worst case, if the
incidence of harmful, but unremedied, police activity (Case One) is
substantial, then the legal system's embrace of the prohibitory remedy of
exclusion actually provides less deterrence than would a functioning loss-
based remedy, one designed to ensure that damages exceeded gains.'
(b) Other Remedies
The clumsiness that characterizes the restitutionary remedy of exclusion
is shared by other prohibitory remedies, but to a lesser extent,'43 for the
140. The available evidence suggests that Case Two cases do not arise with great frequency. See,
e.g., Thomas Y. Davies, A Hard Look at What We Know (and Still Need to Learn) About the "Costs"
of the Exclusionary Rule: The NL Study and Other Studies of "Lost" Arrests, 1983 AM. B. FOUND.
REs. J. 611, 621 (reviewing data indicating that the rule results in nonprosecution or nonconviction of
between 0.6% and 2.35% of suspects arrested for felonies in the state of California); Peter F. Nardulli,
The Social Cost of the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Assessment, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 585,
596 (reporting that motions to suppress were filed in 5% of cases, but were successful only 0.7% of
time).
141. Logic suggests that a great number of Case One cases occur, given that the police, in a wide
variety of contexts such as disturbances, vagrancy, small drug possessions, and the like, frequently act
without regard to the possibility of prosecution, suggesting that the police may violate the law without
meaningful retribution.
142. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 422-27 (1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (advocating a legislated damages remedy to supplant the
exclusionary rule); Foote, supra note 135 (recommending tort remedy with liquidated damages);
Comment, Search and Seizure in Illinois: Enforcement of Constitutional Right of Privacy, 47 Nw. U.L.
REv. 493, 503 (1952) (advocating an official bond for police officers).
143. Consider first the remedy of restitution, of which the rule of exclusion may usefully be
understood as a part. Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 28, at 490. Like exclusion, restitution generally
focuses on the rightful position of the defendant, and not the harm to the plaintiff. The correlation
between the two is somewhat random: defendant may have profited greatly from a trivial harm to
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plaintiff's ready recourse to a meaningful alternative damages remedy helps
ensure that the more punitive sanction is selected, thus promising greater
deterrent effect in those cases. t" Although judges and plaintiffs collabo-
rate in this quest for the larger remedy, each faces the similar problem of
estimating the greater of gain or loss as might be determined by a jury. The
judge and plaintiff may be able to get this estimate correct frequently in the
case of restitutionary disgorgement, where the question is at its most
plaintiff, or plaintiff may have suffered mightily for the sake of defendant's puny profit. In either case,
properly characterizing defendant's gain can be difficult. Consider the historic debate over the character
of the recovery pernitted in Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124 N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910) (holding
shipowner liable for damage caused to dock by ship moored in storm without dockowner's consent).
The criticism of the "unjust enrichment" theory of liability in that case is that the shipowner could have
been unsuccessfl in saving his ship, and thus enjoyed no benefit from the dock's destruction. See
Friedmann, supra note 5, at 542-43 (objecting to the use of the word "benefit" in such circumstances).
To similar effect is the prohibitive remedy of an order to a seller to specifically perform a contract
to sell a product. The seller's required performance in essence transfers to the buyer the seller's
anticipated profits from the breach, because the buyer may now sell the item to the party whose offer
induced the breach if he can find that party. It is possible that the disgorged seller's profits are
substantially larger than the buyer's expected lost profits from the use or resale that the buyer had
contemplated, exclusive of the offeror found by the seller. It is also possible that the seller's
performance comprises a value substantially smaller than the available market damages, as might be
the case in a falling market where the buyer might have preferred to accept substitutionary damages as
they would have been measured at some earlier time. Again, the prohibitory remedy is by design
unrelated to the harm, and thus may produce results that result in a windfall to one of the parties to the
contract.
144. The plaintiff's estimation of the superior remedy is complicated somewhat by the doctrine of
election of remedies, which to prevent double recovery requires the plaintiff (buyer) to ask the jury
either for a prohibitive remedy that might "disaffirn" the contract, for example, or a harm-based remedy
that "affirms" it, but not both. See generally 1 GEORGE PALMER, THE LAW OF REsTITUTION §§ 2.4,
3.10 (1978) (noting the inconsistencies of tort damages and restitution); Friedmann, supra note 5, at 505
(reviewing the common law which "view[ed] restitution as an alternate to tort damages"); 2 DOBBS,
supra note 32, § 9.4 (noting the inconsistencies between damages and rescission). Thus, in a contract
case where defendant's breach was induced by the offer of a third party, the plaintiff who sues for
restitution of his contractual payment and damages from the breach must at some point elect which of
these inconsistent theories will go to the jury. 2 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 9.4; Croeni v. Goldstein, 26
Cal. Rptr. 2d 412, 416 (Ct. App. 1994) ("[S]ince appellants sought to enforce the sale and obtain the
sale price to which they agreed, they cannot recover from [the defendant] profits they would have
earned had they kept the business, since this would amount to a double recovery."); Timmons v.
Bender, 601 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (holding that plaintiffs in real estate transaction could
not sue for fraud where they had elected inconsistent remedy of rescission of the contract of sale);
Bamco Int'l, Inc. v. Arkla, Inc., 628 So. 2d 162 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that plaintiff could be
denied damages based on lost profits where he had elected dissolution of contract). The election
doctrine requires the plaintiff in choosing a remedy to make a prediction as to whether he will be able
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simple.' 45 The other prohibitory remedies present harder cases. Specific
performance, unless it is to be automatically granted at plaintiff's request,
requires the plaintiff/buyer or judge to estimate the value and adequacy of
substitute performance;" an injunction requires them to assess the
likelihood that harm would result, the steps needed to preclude it, and the
value of the interests at stake; 147 and a restitution in quasi-contract
requires that the market value and alternative use value be estimated and
compared.1 41
2. The Risks of Clumsiness
Assuming that in many or even most cases the plaintiff and the judge
can successfully configure which remedy, pricing or prohibitory, will be
worth more to the plaintiff, thus overcoming the inherent clumsiness of
prohibition, nevertheless prohibitory remedies do not promise to produce
a proper level of deterrence. First, the systematic use of prohibitory
remedies would likely underdeter. Prohibitory remedies, although they
145. In the disgorgement or "constructive trust" situation, the question is whether the defendant's
gains from the tortious conduct exceed the losses from the same. Presumptively, these two calculations
should not be much different in degree of difficulty, although the plaintiff might more easily configure
the effect of a tort on his status and well-being than on the defendant.
146. For example, in those cases where buyers guess wrongly about the direction of the market
price (for example, choosing to seek specific performance where the market price will fall or money
damages in a market where price will rise), the penalty to the seller is reduced, lessening the deterrent
effect of the sanction. Similarly, where the buyer guesses wrongly about his ability to find the breach-
inducing offeror, the volume seller can make the sale to the offeror, thus minimizing the penalty from
the prohibitive remedy. The routine award of specific performance assumes that buyers will guess
correctly more times than not to ensure adequate deterrence.
147. The order of an injunction presumes that the judge, perhaps aided by the plaintiff, is able to
complete a series of guesses about one possible future, and is able to conclude that attempting to
circumvent that future constitutes a harsher or more costly penalty on the defendant than simply
requiring him to pay damages for the losses he causes. The hypothesis that deterrence will be increased
as a result of the systematic employment of injunctions assumes that judges will make this decision
correctly more frequently than not. If the judges only make the correct choice about one-half of the
time, or if the magnitude of the incorrect choices outweighs the magnitude of the correct choices, then
deterrence will actually either be unaffected or will diminish as a result of preferring injunctions over
damages.
148. The remedy of restitution (disgorgement) is comparable to exclusion: defendant's gain is not
necessarily related in magnitude to plaintiff's losses, and so requiring disgorgement can constitute a
windfall to plaintiff or a boon to defendant. In this context, however, it might be feasible to rely on
plaintiff to ask for the larger remedy, thus suggesting that civil restitution promises to effect greater
deterrence than the harm-based remedy. Even here, however, plaintiff's choice involves considerable
guesswork. The extent to which defendant's gain will be attributed by a court or jury to his tortious
conduct is not always clear at the outset; no more so is the value of the alternative "pricing" remedy
of damages or punitive damages.
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disgorge the gain from the defendant, 49 may not deter adequately where
the defendant's costs of avoiding the harm are substantial, as would be the
case with any sizable business whose employees regularly engage in
activities that might cause harms. To deter, expected penalties must be
sufficient not only to take away gains, but also to encourage defendants to
undertake the substantial training and supervising costs to modify harm-
producing behaviors. Although "gain" could be defined to include savings
on avoidance, 5 ' these savings would vary contextually and would introduce
significant complexity into the theoretically pristine order of performance
or restitution.'5 '
Second, the fact that prohibitory remedies are clumsy to administer
presents an additional problem: a system of prohibitory remedies depends
more heavily on accuracy than does a loss-based system. In other words,
complexity of measurement is not entirely absent in a system of harm-
based remedies,' 5 but accuracy in the administration of harm-based
remedies matters much less than in the administration of prohibitory
remedies. With gain-based deterrence, the predominant feature of
prohibitory remedies, systematic undervaluation of the defendant's profit
from the wrong risks raises the expected gain above the expected penalty,
leaving no deterrence at all.' 53 Thus, the incentive for the judge when
ordering some form of disgorgement, particularly where the judge suspects
that gain and loss are nearly equal, is to protect against potential undervalu-
149. See I DOBBS, supra note 32, § 4.1(1), at 555 (restitution founded on gain); Levmore & Stuntz,
supra note 28, at 490 (exclusion founded on gain). Specific performance and injunctions are also gain-
based in the sense that they seek to put defendant in his rightful position; i.e., to leave defendant
without his wrongful gain. See Linzer, supra note 2 (arguing that specific performance is justified in
part because it would be wrong to allow promisor to profit from breaking promise).
150. See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Roppolo, 447 N.E.2d 870 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983) (awarding
constructive trust in amount saved by not making promised repairs).
151. The damages remedy does not suffer from this deficiency because its aim is not to prohibit,
but to price. Thus, it does not matter, in regards to deterrence, that a particular defendant may have
substantial avoidance costs that exceed the harm-based measure of damages, for here the pricing theory
would suggest that the defendant not expend resources in excess of damages as a precaution against this
behavior. In any event, in theory the loss-based measure should customarily exceed the gain-based
measure simply because harms should routinely exceed gains for a particular activity to be labeled
unlawful in some sense. If so, then the expected penalty from a harm-based measure, measured by the
average penalty times incidence of conviction, will be larger than one from a gain-based measure.
152. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
153. Valuing gains and losses from a completed event appear to be about equally difficult: each
might effect relative well-being or competitive positions for many years subsequent. The problem of
estimation, however, looms quite larger when a court chooses to employ a prohibitory remedy, such as
an injunction, which requires judges to amass and process a limitless supply of information relevant to
the proper crafting of relief. See supra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
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ation by systematically and without any necessary logical limitation
overvaluing the defendant's profits,154 eventually taking from the defen-
dant profits not traceable to the wrong. As a result, gain-based deterrence
risks overdeterrenceY55
3. Summary
The proposition that prohibitory remedies engender deterrence to a
degree greater than the alternative, harm-based damages remedy rests on a
series of questionable assumptions about the incidence of types of cases
and the accuracy of the measurements and predictions about the future
made in a context filled with uncertainty. Because prohibitory remedies are,
by design, unrelated to the degree of harm that produced them, they contain
no guarantee that they will be employed only when they will augment
market deterrence. Even assuming appropriate employment, however,
prohibitory remedies will not create a desirable system of deterrence. They
will underdeter where avoidance costs are substantial and overdeter if
courts fear gain to be systematically insufficient to deter.
B. Prohibitory Remedies May Increase Undesirable Risk-Taking
Prohibitory remedies do not appear to present an attractive option for
judges who wish to devise a sanction that systematically increases
deterrence. Prohibitory remedies are difficult to administer, and are by
design unrelated to the relevant harm, thus producing unpredictable results
in deterring harmful conduct. 56 Apart from such considerations, however,
lie the behavioral effects that prohibitory remedies generate. Unlike harm-
based remedies, prohibitory remedies tend to (1) lead to improper risk
management, (2) encourage risk-taking in undesirable contexts, and (3)
154. See, e.g., JEFFREY S. PARKER, CRIMINAL SENTENCING POLICY FOR ORGANIZATIONS 36-40
(U.S. Sentencing Comm'n Staff Working Paper, 1988) (arguing that such a judicial adjustment would
result in "overdeterrence").
155. By comparison, accomplishing deterrence with a loss-based sanction requires much less
confidence in the accuracy of the sanction. Regardless of whether the assessed sanction is a little high
or low in comparison to the "real" harm, the aim of the harm-based sanction is met. The defendant will
"internalize" all or most of the social harms he has caused, thus deterring him and others from seeking
the presumed smaller personal profit at the expense of the larger harm in the next case. If it is the case
that the profits generated in a particular class of cases consistently exceeds the social harm, then one
might wonder why the socially profitable activity is discouraged by regulation in the first place; the
activity looks more like capitalism than crime. Even in individual cases where the actual gain exceeds
harm, adequate deterrence should be produced by a harm-based remedy: just because the defendant hit
the jackpot once does not alter the expected penalty and expected gain, which are averages.
156. See text accompanying notes supra notes 133-55.
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elicit risk-avoiding expenditures in misdirected or wasteful ways. In short,
prohibitory remedies create incentives for behaviors that actually increase
the incidence of undesirable risk-taking.
1. On Risk Management
One behavioral effect engendered by prohibitory remedies is poor risk
management. Although the common employment of prohibitory remedies
might render judges better at prediction,157 it would commensurately
render potential wrongdoers less adept at assessing risk on their own.
Because damages remedies price harms, they encourage potential
defendants to assess risk and exercise judgment in deciding upon the
appropriate combination of risk and caution in undertaking a particular
enterprise.'58 In theory, the potential defendant may assume (and inflict)
as much risk as he prefers, aware that an incorrect judgment in this regard
will carry an expected penalty in excess of his expected gains,'59 and thus
will tend to be socially and personally wasteful. The take-and-pay remedial
system thus inculcates into potential defendants a certain perspicacity of
risk assessment. Accordingly, implicit in a system of harm-based remedies
is the acceptance of a certain number of immature and unwise personal
decisions regarding risk. These harms are exchanged for the gradual
teaching, through the deterrence of damages, of a level of maturity of
judgment concerning the likelihood that certain risks will cause harms. 6
With a systematic preference for prohibitory remedies, this valuable
teaching function is diminished. Prohibitory remedies do not promise to
teach citizens to assess reasonable behavior in ever-changing contexts.
Rather, prohibitory remedies dictate behavior in more narrow contexts.
They constitute a "personal order"'' that directs persons or groups of
157. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 19-30 and accompanying text.
159. It should be understood here that adequate deterrence under the take-and-pay system requires
that the probability of enforcement be unity or "I," and that a significantly smaller probability requires
an adjustment of the magnitude of the penalty to maintain adequate deterrence. See infra notes 281-307
and accompanying text.
160. This teaching function of market damages appears a valuable one. The financial and human
practicalities of public and private law enforcement suggest strongly that the legal system could not
sustain its caseload absent mature private risk assessment, or if the great mass of citizens decided to
inflict harm on each other wilfully. Thus, effective law enforcement and peaceable communities
probably rely to a great deal on the encouragement and practice of daily risk minimization by countless
private decisions in a limitless variety of contexts.
161. Doug Rendleman, Irreparability Irreparably Damaged, 90 MIcH. L. REV. 1642, 1644 (1992)
(book review) ("Usually legal relief is money and equitable relief is a personal order.").
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persons to behave in a certain way or to do a certain thing in order to avoid
harm. With prohibitory remedies, it is the judge, typically, who assesses the
risk inherent in a particular situation and the judge who renders judgment
on lawful, risk-minimizing behavior. The role of the citizen is not to learn
through trial and error; rather, prohibitory remedies teach citizens to obey.
Thus, prohibitory remedies do not fully replicate the teaching function of
damages.
162
Prohibitory remedies also render effective risk management more
problematic by inhibiting the flow of information that might assist in
managing risk. In the world of harm-based damages remedies, the
defendant should be able to "internalize" the harm through the suit for
money, measured by loss. Thus, to the extent that enforcement is
optimal,' 63 damages suits provide excellent conduits to inform the
defendant that his choice to create risk caused a harm that is to be avoided.
Prohibitory remedies do not transmit this information, which is vital to the
appropriate shaping of behavior, so easily. By design, prohibitory remedies
seek to preclude risky activities, and thus the outcomes of risky activities
might never be learned. For example, an injunction ordering defendant not
to emit a certain substance into a river prohibits the creation of the datum
as to the effect of that emission. Similarly, a court order requiring specific
performance of a contract to supply inputs to a manufacturer may, unless
the manufacturer located alternate suppliers prior to contracting, prohibit the
creation of the datum as to whether the manufacturer could have found an
alternate supplier more cheaply than the opportunity cost to the supplier in
performing the contract. Moreover, even violations of the prohibitory order
162. It is not meant to suggest that the award of any particular prohibitive remedy, or even a slight
trend toward their routinization, by itself will make children out of adults. The extent to which law
functions as a teacher is speculative, and it is not clear that people can not learn to assess risk maturely
on their own, without the law's guidance, given the enormous range of human behavior that by its
relative insignificance falls outside of the realm of law. Nevertheless, a great deal of behavior is within
law's province, and many people in some of their capacities are required to comply regularly with
multivariate legal standards. A remedial system that features prohibition wagers heavily that these
people, in those contexts where prohibition is absent, will be sufficiently comfortable and familiar with
such notions as "reasonableness" or "due care" to structure their behavior, and perhaps that of
subordinates, in ways that are socially beneficial. Where an area of activity has been rather completely
taken over by prescription, such as the task of police interrogations for example, see infra notes 176-89
and accompanying text, one might reasonably doubt that the relevant decisionmakers will develop
enough experience with dealing with the unique set of inherent risks to make wise judgments about the
degree of "coercion" introduced into a particular interrogation.
163. This is a large qualification and will be addressed in Part V. See infra notes 281-307 and
accompanying text.
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do not always provide the information necessary to assess the likelihood of
harms from risk because the prohibitory order may require the defendant
to behave in ways that are completely unrelated to the harm. For example,
an order to keep records of the dates of waste disposal does not, if that
order is violated, produce data on whether or not a disposal into a river is
harmful.
Prohibitory remedies do not render appropriate risk management
impossible; rather, they tend to render it more difficult by lessening the
teaching function of market damages, and by requiring that the information
necessary to shape behavior, or to craft prohibitory remedies, be obtained
through means other than trial and error. Prohibitory remedies transfer the
task of risk management from the potential defendant to the judge, and
shift the task of information-development from the relatively simple device
of trial and error to the domain of experts who must predict outcomes
hypothetically.
2. On Undesirable Risk Encouragement
Prohibitory remedies not only render risk management difficult,'t  they
also have an ambiguous effect on risk encouragement. At some point, all
sanctions "price," even criminal ones,1 65 and so it is important to consider
the relative effect any choice of remedy might have on encouraging
undesirable risk. Because prohibitory remedies differ from market remedies,
they engender a different behavioral response. The simplest way in which
prohibitory remedies differ from market remedies is in magnitude: where
either is available and the plaintiff asks for a prohibitory remedy, then the
prohibitory remedy is assumedly more valuable to the plaintiff than the
alternative market remedy.166 A gain-based remedy that leaves plaintiffs
better off than they would have been under prevailing market or legal
164. See supra notes 156-63 and accompanying text.
165. One reason why penalties differ among crimes is the recognition that at least some criminals,
or perhaps many, are deterred to a certain degree by certain sanctions: thus, marginally higher penalties
are a way to encourage wrongdoers to commit less harmful or serious crimes. See generally George .
Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 . POL. EcoN. 526 (1970) (discussing the crime level
in economic terms of supply and demand).
166. In some cases, however, the prescriptive remedy might be worth less to the plaintiff than the
alternative damages remedy. The best example here might be a restitutionary recovery that is measured
by the defendant's saved precautionary expenses, where these expenses ought, if the conduct in question
causes more harm than gain, to be smaller than the resultant harm. See Levmore & Stuntz, supra note
28, at 484-85 (arguing that restitution of the cost of precaution-taking will not provide adequate
incentive for precautionary behavior). Courts, however, do not usually measure the restitutionary
recovery by the savings from the wrong. Laycock, supra note 101, at 1290.
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standards risks creating a "moral hazard"' 67 for potential plaintiffs to get
hurt and seek rents. 6
The "moral hazard" potentially created by the more valuable prohibitory
remedies, however, should not arise in many cases. Remedies define
precautionary markets,169 thus providing deterrence for both potential
defendants and potential plaintiffs. Where the potential plaintiff and
potential defendant together are liable for all the costs from a given
activity, then a change in the remedy should have no net effect on the total
level of precautionary activity. Specifically, to the extent that harms to
potential plaintiffs are compensated more generously by prohibitory
remedies than by the ordinary market remedies, the deterrent effect of
remedies on the potential plaintiff is diminished. However, this diminish-
ment should be correspondingly offset by the defendant's increased
incentives to avoid incurring liability under the more onerous prohibitory
remedy 7 ° Consequently, in the best case, the net addition in deterrence
from the adoption of prohibitory remedies should be zero.'
167. See Levmore & Stuntz, supra note 28, at 485-86. Moral hazards may be present in certain
damages cases as well. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 583-86 (discussing the problem of moral
hazards with respect to liquidated damages provisions). The moral hazards springing from the damages
remedy should be small, however, as most sensible plaintiffs would prefer not to be injured in the first
place. At best, a fully compensatory damages remedy, precisely equal to actual losses, should leave
plaintiffs indifferent.
168. This problem of the moral hazard is worsened if the plaintiff is permitted to acquire some of
the profits stemming from defendant's ingenuity or effort. Consider the famous case of Olwell v. Nye
& Nissen Co., 173 P.2d 652 (Wash. 1946), where the owner of an unused egg-washing machine was
allowed to collect the profits, in the form of saved labor, from a manufacturer who had converted the
machine. Without the conversion, plaintiff's profit from owning the machine appeared to be zero, or
even a loss due to storage costs. Because the court permitted the plaintiff to recover in restitution, a
prohibitory remedy, the plaintiff was given defendant's profits, which exceeded both possible market
remedies: the rental value of the machine or its replacement value. Moral hazards might also arise due
to the court's inability to trace losses. See Friedmann, supra note 5, at 553-54.
169. In part, the law of remedies creates these markets by giving a particular personal interest,
formerly damnum absque injuria, legal protection. Remedies also define these markets by drawing the
line between defendant's liability and plaintiff's liability, the latter expressed through various doctrines
that exculpate the defendant, such as contributory negligence, the doctrine of avoidable consequences,
proximate causation, and the like.
170. Coase's theorem holds that the rules of liability do not matter where transactions costs are low.
Coase, supra note 89. Here, although torts frequently occur between strangers and without opportunity
for preharm bargaining, the applicable legal rules specify obligations in the manner of a contract They
thus instigate the search for the liability rule that would inflict liability on the cheaper cost avoider in
an effort to minimize joint costs, as presumably would a contract.
171 . At best, the introduction of prescriptive remedies would seem to leave the sum of harm-
avoiding behavior unchanged, simply shifting burdens from plaintiffs to defendants. It would thus
appear irrelevant to the incidence of harm where the line of liability is drawn, assuming the rate of
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A change in the predominate remedy may in fact have a neutral effect
in many circumstances. For example, the parties to a business contract may
not know before the event if they will be plaintiffs or defendants, and
probably see themselves potentially as both. They will accordingly take
precautions both to minimize the harm from their contractee's breach and
to maximize their opportunities to breach with relative impunity. In this
context, a variation in the generousness of the remedy from the plaintiff's
perspective, for example, should produce no net loss in precautionary
activity because the increase in deterrence for the potential aggrievor will
be offset by the decrease in avoidance by the potential aggrieved. More
broadly, a change in the allocation of risk in tort cases should not in the
long run alter the level of deterrence that pertains to the activity giving rise
to the tort, but instead should merely constitute a transfer of responsibility
for precautionary activity between the parties. On this analysis, a move
from a preference for damages remedies to a preference for prohibitory
remedies should not alter the level of deterrence.
In some cases, however, one or both of the parties are not liable for all
the consequences from a harm, but rather can transfer the cost of that
remedy to a third party. For example, a plaintiff in a mistaken improvement
case who prevails in a claim for restitution is compensated not only by the
defendant, but also from the community in the form of forgone wealth. 2
Or a plaintiff who prevails in a claim for an injunction achieves his rightful
position at the expense of the defendant and the community.'73 Where the
cost of a remedy is borne by a party other than the defendant or the
plaintiff, a moral hazard arises, and so the expenditures by the parties on
precautionary activity will be diminished commensurate with the third
party's liability. If it is true that prohibitory remedies characteristically tend
to provide compensation in part at public expense, 74 then the moral
hazard that prohibitory remedies create will actually tend to diminish the
amount of precautionary expenditures, thus encouraging socially undesir-
able risk-taking, decreasing deterrence, and adding to the quantity of harms.' 5
detecting harm remains unchanged.
172. See supra notes 105-13 and accompanying text.
173. See supra notes 54-65 and accompanying text.
174. See infra notes 248-53 and accompanying text.
175. Assuming that persons generally are more risk-averse to being the victim of a tort than a
tortfeasor, on the assumption that damages do not compensate sufficiently to render one indifferent
between being harmed or being compensated, then lessening the deterrent level on potential plaintiffs
will diminish the total amount of deterrence in the system. This problem, however, may be overcome
by an increase in enforcement rates that may arise due to the added incentive to sue that prescriptive
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As a result, it matters a great deal whether prohibitory remedies in fact
cost the public more to devise, administer and award than do the alternative
damages remedies. If they do not, then at best all the proponents of
prohibitory remedies can fairly claim is that adopting a preference for
prohibitory remedies will have a neutral effect on deterrence. If they do
engender greater social costs, then a preference for prohibitory remedies
creates a moral hazard, diminishing the deterrent incentives to take proper
care. Under neither circumstance, however, can it be truly claimed that the
adoption of a preference for prohibitory remedies will increase deterrence.
Prohibitory remedies also potentially encourage undesirable risk-taking
because they tend to shape behavior in accordance with the prohibitory
standard, and not the harm that is the object of the standard. By refocusing
behavior, prohibitory remedies may actually increase the incidence of risky
behavior, thus increasing the incidence of harm.
Consider the risk-engendering effects of the prohibitory remedy of the
Miranda7 ' warnings. The constitutional harm at which the Miranda
warnings aim is a coerced or involuntary confession.'77 The warnings,
however, must be given only when the suspect is in "custody,"' 78 with
exclusion the remedy for their denial.'79 Moreover, it is only after the
suspect is warned that he fully gains the right to remain silent and to have
an attorney present during questioning."' Consequently, the suspect gains
incentives to get arrested,'8 ' certainly a "harm" to the defendant under
normal circumstances, because once arrested, a suspect may invoke the
right to silence and request that a lawyer be present when dealing with
police, whereas prior to the arrest these requests can be lawfully de-
nied.' 2 Miranda's prohibition also gives police incentives not to arrest
remedies give plaintiffs. It is possible that prohibitory remedies could make potential defendants more
sensitive to causing harm, both because the increased cost of liability will itself draw more attention
and because the plaintiffs simply have a greater incentive to pursue more valuable remedies.
176. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
177. Id. at 445 (devising warnings due to difficulty of recreating interrogation scene).
178. Id. at 467. "Custody" means that a person is deprived of his freedom in some significant way.
See United States v. Griffin, 922 F.2d 1343 (8th Cir. 1990) (listing factors indicating deprivation).
179. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
180. See Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231 (1980) (holding that prearrest, prewamings silence may
be used to impeach); Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990) (holding that warnings not required where
suspect, an inmate, not being questioned by captors).
181. Strangely, it behooves a suspect to get arrested to avoid the use of his silence for impeachment
purposes. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. 231.
182. This result is implied by the court's decision in McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171, 181 n.3
(1991 ) (holding that an invocation of the right to counsel under the Sixth Amendment did not constitute
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suspects if they fear that the "Miranda rights" will be invoked. Instead,
Miranda's prohibitory system leads police to conduct interrogations pre-
arrest using undercover agents183 or parole officers,' to delay arrest
after obtaining probable cause,185 to delay arrest if the confrontation can
be characterized as a "stop," 186 or to devise other methods to manipulate
the rules of Miranda.'"
Thus, Miranda's prohibition and its valuable restitutionary remedy of
exclusion creates perverse incentives. Miranda draws suspects into arrest,
a coercive situation, and draws police officers into pre-arrest forms of
interrogation, which are, for police officers, a context that permits forms of
deceit that might be condemned in interrogation. Both sides are propelled
toward coercion, which is precisely the harm against which the remedy is
supposed to aim.188 In addition, the focus on the prohibitory remedy of
an invocation of the right to counsel because "a person can[not] invoke his Miranda rights
anticipatorily, in a context other than custodial interrogation').
183. See Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (holding that as long as the suspect does not know that he is talking
to a police agent, and as long as the suspect has not been indicted (or its equivalent) for the subject
matter of the questioning, then Miranda does not apply).
184. See Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984) (holding that the privilege against self-
incrimination is not violated when suspect, a probationer, is questioned about a crime by parole officer).
185. Jenkins, 447 U.S. 231 (holding that silence during the period of delay may be used for
impeachment purposes if the defendant testifies).
186. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984) (holding that prearrest statements made pursuant
to a Terry stop or a traffic stop are admissible in evidence).
187. Miranda has generated a series of cases involving police practices that evidence how easily
the court-devised prohibitory rules can be circumvented. For example, the police may delay giving
Miranda warnings after arresting, because silence during the period of delay may be used for
impeachment purposes if the defendant testifies. Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982) (holding that
it is constitutionally permissible to use postarrest, prewarnings silence to impeach). Moreover, the
defendant might volunteer statements before being warned. Arizona v. Mauro, 481 U.S. 520 (1987)
(allowing an officer to observe and record postcustody conversation between spouses because statements
are not the result of police interrogation). The police also need not inform the defendant of the most
serious crimes of which he is suspected. Mere silence regarding the subject matter of an investigation
is not "trickery" sufficient to taint the waiver. Colorado v. Spring, 479 U.S. 564 (1987) (holding that
suspect need not be aware of all subjects of interrogation); see also Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412
(1986) (holding that where suspect has not requested counsel, police may preclude counsel from seeing
client; thus giving the police an incentive to lie to the suspect's lawyer to keep the suspect
incommunicado and obtain a confession); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (1983) (finding question
"what is going to happen to me now?" asked after invocation of rights initiated recommencement of
discussion about crime, permitting interrogation directed toward inducing the suspect to disclose the
facts of crime and to agree to a lie detector test).
188. Other prohibitory remedies can pose the same problem as the Miranda warnings. For example,
if the injunction entered against Sue, see supra note 66 and accompanying text, prohibits her from
writing her former clients, then former clients are given the incentive to telephone or visit in person.
Thus, like the Miranda warnings, the injunction actually may engender greater opportunities for
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Miranda warnings may lead judges away from the more important inquiry
into the coercive nature of the police activity.'89
Finally, one more troublesome problem stems from a preference for
prohibitory remedies: the awesome power of certain equitable prohibitory
remedies to bind defendants may, in certain contexts, lead to collusion
among parties to cause harm in order to obtain the remedy. This possibility
supplies a plausible explanation for the remarkable frequency of sham
litigation in Title VII actions. Approximately one-third of all Title VII
actions filed by the Justice Department between 1972 and 1983 were settled
by a "consent decree," essentially a settlement agreement embodying an
injunction, on the very day of filing.' 90 This remarkable fact suggests that
the parties are actively colluding to obtain the prohibitory remedy of an
injunction, allowing the parties in a public law litigation, for example, to
bind successors in interest, a particularly attractive goal for elected officials
or for others whose interests might not be shared by successors. 91 Thus,
the moral hazard of prohibitory remedies may evidence itself in parties'
colluding to acquire them.
solicitation, the harm to be avoided. To avoid a defeat of the injunction, a court has the incentive to
devise the broadest remedy imaginable, thus protecting Traditional's interests at the expense of Sue's
rightful position.
189. Today, few confessions are found to be involuntary. Welsh S. White, Interrogation Without
Quesntons, 78 MICH. L. REV. 1209 (1980). Professors Saltzburg and Capra have wondered if judges
have created a "presumption" of voluntariness if the suspect waives his Miranda rights. STEPHEN A.
SALTZBURG & DANIEL J. CAPRA, AMERICAN CRImNAL PRocEDuRE 497-502 (4th ed. 1992). To the
extent that the prohibitory remedy fails to diminish harm, it also elicits wasteful expenditures. The
Miranda warnings system, with its multiple opportunities for violations leading to exclusion, assumedly
has become a focus of police training, supplanting to some extent the teaching of how to avoid tactics
that would tend to overwhelm a suspect's will. To the extent that these warnings fail to do their job in
reducing the harm at issue, the prohibitory remedy causes a severe misallocation of precautionary
resources.
190. Maimon Schwarzschild, Public Law By Private Bargain: Title VfI Consent Decrees and the
Fairness of Negotiated Institutional Reform, 1984 DUKE L.J. 887, 913.
191. See generally id. See also United States v. Hall, 472 F.2d 261 (5th Cir. 1972) (imposing an
injunction personally binding third party from interfering with "res" of litigation).
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C. Prohibitory Remedies Hinder Wealth Maximization'9
Prohibitory remedies do not promise to expand the incentives that
potential plaintiffs and potential defendants have to minimize undesirable
riss;193 indeed, in certain situations their widespread use may lead to an
increase in the incidence of harmful activity. 94 Nonetheless, a preference
for prohibitory remedies, and the full compensation they appear to promote,
may constitute a desirable substitute for the predominant loss-based
damages remedies if the prohibitory remedies can better fulfill the remedial
goal of wealth maximization."'5 Unfortunately, prohibitory remedies do
not appear to promote wealth maximization; indeed, they appear to promote
its opposite.
Prohibitory remedies protect the plaintiff's idiosyncratic or sentimental
valuations.9 Idiosyncratic valuations are those that are not reflected in
the market price.197 For example, a pocket watch may be worth one
hundred dollars on the market,9 but the fact that it was a special present
from grandfather renders its value to the grandchild much greater. If the
watch were converted, the market-oriented, harm-based remedy would
192. There are, besides wealth maximization, other fundamentally instrumentalist explanations of
remedial law, including wealth redistribution. See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort
Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 449 (1992). This section will focus on wealth maximization due to its
current academic popularity instigated by Judge Posner. For Posner's description of the remedial goal
of wealth maximization, see POSNER, supra note 108, at 356; Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism,
Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STuD. 103 (1979) [hereinafter Posner, Utilitarianism]
(arguing that wealth maximization provides a normative grounding for law). See also D. Bruce Johnsen,
Wealth Is Value, 15 J LEGAL STuD. 263 (1986). Regarding other instrumentalist goals such as wealth
redistribution, it has been argued that litigation should be used instrumentally to reshape distributions.
See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.L 472 (1980).
193. See supra notes 130-55 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 156-91 and accompanying text.
195. Efficiency comprises one manner of talking about wealth maximization, see Lawson, supra
note 108, and several scholars have defended prohibitory remedies on the ground of economic
efficiency. See Linzer, supra note 2; Schwartz, supra note 5.
196. The concept of idiosyncratic or sentimental valuations is a broad one. See Linzer, supra note
2, at 119 (arguing for specific performance due to idiosyncratic values at stake in "non-commercial"
transactions); Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 570 ("Idiosyncratic value would include any subjective
or 'fanciful' valuation which varied significantly from the established market value."). In regard to land,
for example, an owner may have made unique modifications or improvements to a property, and may
personally abhor the costs and inconveniences of relocation. Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of
Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 61, 83 (1986).
197. See generally Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 562-65.
198. This example is drawn from I DoBBs, supra note 32, § 4.1(1), at 554.
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generally require a damages payment of the market value.199 By compari-
son, a remedy that prescribed restitution of the watch or the similar legal
remedy of replevin protects the grandchild's idiosyncratic valuation,
recognizing that market value does not "adequately" compensate for the
defendant's harm.2"u
Other prohibitory remedies similarly operate to protect nonmarket,
idiosyncratic values.2 ' 1 For example, consider a case where Smith is the
owner of a summer home that borders a milling plant. 2 The plant
habitually blows dust onto Smith's house and fouls the stream that runs
through both properties, which harms can be abated only by terminating
operations at the plant. To enjoin the plant, Smith must convince the court,
in addressing the "balance of the equities," that his harms from the
nuisances are greater than the plant's harms from closure.0 3 A failure of
proof on this issue relegates Smith to damages, requiring him either to
accept living with the plant's emissions or to move. Assume that Smith
fails to establish superior market value,2" and that his only plausible
claim for superior losses derives from the fact that Smith's summer house
has been in the family for generations, thus generating tremendous
sentimental values that exceed the value of the plant remaining in
operation. If the judge issues an injunction closing the plant, the order
would protect Smith's idiosyncratic values over the relative market values.
There appears to be nothing presumptively wrong with requiring
defendants to compensate plaintiffs for idiosyncratic losses; more
problematic is that plaintiff's idiosyncratic compensation comes not only
in the form of a transfer payment from defendant to plaintiff, but also in
199. See supra note 20; cf. infra note 301.
200. The rule requiring that the legal remedy be inadequate has had an uneven history in regard to
restitution, perhaps in part because restitution was historically provided at both law and equity. See
SCHOENBROD ET AL., supra note 116, at 549 ("At bottom, the best one can say is that sometimes an
adequate legal remedy bars equitable rescission, sometimes it does not, largely without rhyme or
reason."). But cf 1 PALMER, supra note 144, § 1.6 ("Although an occasional decision suggests that
restitution will be denied when alternative remedies are considered adequate, innumerable cases
demonstrate that this is incorrect.').
201. Rescission, a remedy closely related to restitution, see I DOBBS, supra note 32, § 4.3(6), might
also profitably be understood as a device to protect idiosyncratic values. Id. ("Equity rescission is also
needed whenever the plaintiff wants a recovery of specific property having special or unique qualities.").
202. These facts are drawn from Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736 (2d Cir. 1927).
203. See generally I DOBBS, supra note 32, § 2.9(2).
204. In Staso, the mill established that its loss from closure exceeded the loss in value to Smith's
property, and indeed, exceeded the total market price of Smith's land and improvements absent the
plant. 18 F.2d at 737.
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the form of social loss to the community. Unlike a transfer payment, which
would appear to have no positive or negative effect on social wealth,
compensation for idiosyncratic values can in some cases cause an actual
diminishment of social wealth. Idiosyncratic values, by definition, are
inalienable. They represent a value that only Smith, in the example, in fact
appreciates," 5 and thus do not promise to be capitalized or translated into
social wealth.0 6 The values protected by the prohibitory remedy cannot
in the market command the price they implicitly commanded in the court-
room. Although Smith's utility is increased by the injunction, social wealth
is actually diminished, with no chance of recoupment. The opportunity cost
of protecting Smith's idiosyncracies, which in this example is the amount
by which the operating value of the plant exceeded the market value of the
summer home, represents a social loss. Consequently, plaintiff's claim to
full compensation lies not only against the defendant, but also against the
community which pays for protection of idiosyncratic values at the expense
of wealth creation.07 Because the injunction here represents a transfer of
wealth from the community to Smith, then the injunction is tantamount to
205. The notion of subjective or idiosyncratic valuations is partially captured within the economist's
term "consumer surplus," which denotes the subjective valuations above market price that lead a
consumer to purchase at the market price; i.e., the difference between what the consumer would be
willing to pay and what the consumer pays in fact. Consumer surplus is essential to the creation of
wealth, as in theory a good is sold and resold as successive buyers offer to purchase at a price in excess
of the holder's consumer surplus, but within the buyer's consumer surplus.
Courts have usually been less precise in defining consumer surplus on those occasional instances
where they have recognized what lawyers think of as subjective or idiosyncratic value3. The courts'
notion seems to refer to a plaintiff's valuations ofa broad array of sentimental attachments to property,
without regard to the plaintiff's willingness to pay for them. See, e.g., Brown v. Frontier Theaters, Inc.,
369 $.W.2d 299, 305 (Tex. 1963) (holding that where various heirlooms were lost, plaintiff was
permitted to recover for "the reasonable special value of such articles to their owner taking into
consideration the feelings of the owner for such property"); Bond v. A.H. Belo Corp., 602 S.W.2d 105
(rex. Civ. App. 1980) (reversing lower court's rulings that had excluded plaintiff's "fanciful or
sentimental considerations" from the measure of damages, holding that "feelings" were properly part
of value of family papers and photographs); cf. Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308, 1311
(Wash. 1979) (en bane) (holding that an award for loss of a personal item should be measured as the
"actual value to the [owner]," which includes some element of sentiment, and that it is only "unusual
sentimental value" or a "fanciful price" that is inappropriate in assessing damages).
206. In comparison, Staso's personal profit coincidentally comprises a social profit, as it is
immediately realized and transferred into purchases, salaries, and so forth. See supra notes 107-13 and
accompanying text.
207. The proposition that prohibitory remedies tend to cause wealth diminishment should not be
understood to constitute an argument against ever granting a prohibitory remedy. In some instances,
other remedial goals will justify wealth diminishment. See infra notes 271-307 and accompanying text.
Rather, this contention suggests caution in establishing prohibitory remedies as the routine or regular
remedy as some have suggested. See supra note 5.
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a public good. Plaintiffs have the incentive to seek the injunction regardless
of its cost to social wealth, and others are unable to exclude them from
it.20
8
Like Smith's injunction, the prohibitory remedy of specific performance
appears to create a public good problem, as it sometimes may protect
idiosyncratic values at the expense of market values." 9 Performance can
be wasteful, as for example where the plaintiff desires performance for
reasons of vindictiveness, or more generally in any situation where the
plaintiff's gains from obtaining performance exceed on idiosyncratic
grounds the market value of substitute performance. Performance here is
socially wasteful, because the court's order protects the plaintiff's interest
in what is, by definition, a value upon which the plaintiff does not promise
to capitalize. Specific performance in the face of a superior third-party offer
at worst creates waste, if the contract good is delivered to the promisee
without the possibility of resale,"0 and at best engenders deadweight
efficiency loss, where the promisee extracts a premium from the promisor
to permit sale to the third-party offeror.2 ' The potential social wasteful-
ness of the remedy of specific performance in the face of a higher bid
might help to explain the tenacity of the prohibition against parties'
contracting into performance remedies or into liquidated damage provisions
that amount to "penalties," despite sustained academic criticism."'
208. Understanding prohibitory remedies as "public goods" provides a strong reason not to grant
plaintiffs an "automatic injunction" when they ask for one, see Schwartz, supra note 5; they will ask
for one until available funds are exhausted. See infra notes 222-32 and accompanying text. Thus, it
seems sensible to find a way to encourage the judge to limit access to prevent depletion. The traditional
i rble injury rule serves this function. See infra notes 291-96 and accompanying text.
209. Statutes that structure equitable balancing, see supra note 123, can similarly be wealth
diminishing. These statutes protect certain idiosyncratic values, such as certain citizen's interests in
protection from harsh treatment, to an extent greater than would the market. Thus, these statutes
constitute "subsidies" for certain values, and trade off economic gain for other goods. See Tennessee
Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (holding that the Endangered Species Act protects various
forms of life regardless of costs).
210. PosNER, supra note 6, § 4.11.
211. See Yorio, supra note 5, at 1381-85 (arguing that these negotiations could be protracted in the
posthreach context with a contract involving fungible goods). The negotiations would presumably be
more strenuous in the case of unique goods, where cover is by definition less available. But see
Kronman, supra note 5, at 367-68 (arguing that the promisor, ex ante, is unlikely to anticipate better
offer with unique good, and thus "nearly indifferent' regarding the remedies for breach).
212. On the prohibition against contacting into perfoimance and other remedies, see generally 3
DOBBS, supra note 32, § 12.9(6). See also Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 568-77 (arguing that
penalties clauses provide an efficient method to protect idiosyncratic valuations); Kronman, supra note
5, at 369-76 (arguing that parties should be permitted to contract into specific performance to protect
uncompensated values). The argument respecting the wastefulness of enforcing "penalizing" liquidated
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In many cases involving specific performance, however, idiosyncratic
values may be protected without incurring a social cost. As Professor
Kronman argues, where the promisee stands to gain more from the delivery
of the unique good than the ordinary damages remedy would allow, and
thus would be motivated by the risk of breach and subsequent
undercompensation to pay the promisor a premium to agree to perform the
contract,"3 then the remedy presents little danger of diminishing social
wealth, because presumably the promisee intends to capitalize fully on the
performance. Indeed, by striking the deal at an above-market price, the
promisee has already capitalized some of his idiosyncratic valuations or
consumer surplus."' A higher contract price as an inducement for
promisor's performance operates identically, for economic purposes, to a
damages provisions proceeds along the same path as that in the text regarding specific performance.
Although the contract price may be above market to reflect the greater exposure of the promisor under
the damages clause, a decision by a court to enforce the penalty will marginally discourage resale at
a superior price, thus eliminating a chance to capitalize on value. See infra notes 213-21 and
accompanying text; see also, Linzer, supra note 2, at 118.
213. See Kronman, supra note 5, at 365-69. Compare Schwartz, supra note 5, at 282-83 (arguing
that promisors will resist agreeing to performance remedies in contracts involving unique goods, due
to the possibility of rapid rises in price stemming from inelastic supply), with Yorio, supra note 5, at
1378 (arguing that promisors cannot resist requests for performance without raising promisee's
suspicions, thus harming goodwill). Professor Kronman's analysis of this point is puzzling. He admits
that the promisor would be more reluctant to provide for specific performance in the case of a unique
good due to the lack of easy substitution, Kronman, supra note 5, at 367, but then concludes by
suggesting that the promisor in a unique goods case will be "nearly indifferent as to what remedies the
promisee will enjoy in the highly unlikely event of breach," owing to the foreseen paucity of third-party
offers, id. at 368. It seems paradoxical to claim that a promisor would be indifferent as to a promise
and yet put a high price on it. Unfortunately, it is on this paradox that Professor Kronman's entire
argument rests, for if in fact the promisor is not "nearly indifferent" to being bound to specifically
perform the delivery of a unique good, then ex ante both parties will not prefer those clauses in unique
goods contracts, and the extant rules do not necessarily minimize joint costs. Rather, "it would appear
that the benefits to the promisee and the costs to the promisor of a specific performance provision are
proportional," id. at 367, and the uniqueness of the good tells us nothing interesting about when that
proportion might change.
214. Offering a higher price would only increase the relative security of performance, not render
it absolute. But specific performance provides only relative security as well, because the ultimate
performance is (impliedly) conditioned on a variety of factors outside of the control of both the
promisor and promisee, such as the absence of an act of God. The promisee could also ensure
performance by outbidding the third party. Once promisors are assured that the promisee could not
coerce performance, they would likely avail the promisee of an opportunity to outbid a third party. But
see Yorio, supra note 5, at 1395-96 (asserting that in construction and restoration contracts, promisors
breach without informing the promisee). Although these negotiations do inject some costs into the
transfer of contract goods, a regime featuring specific performance or idiosyncratic damages allocations
would do no better. In each case, promisors and promisees interested in maximizing joint gains would
have to arrange a deal, either to buy out the promisee's right to specific performance, or to establish
the extent of above-market idiosyncratic value.
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liquidated damage clause. Each encourages performance in the face of a
higher third-party bid and provides grounds for compensation for
unrecoverable idiosyncratic losses.215 Contracting at a higher price carries
the advantage over liquidated damage clauses of not discouraging resale at
a superior price, and thus not losing a chance to capitalize on value.21 6
Bids by third parties need only be superior to the contract price, not the
"penalizing" liquidated damages.217
The problem of social wealth diminishment should not generally be
present where the parties contractually agree to liquidated damage clauses
or specific performance because the idiosyncratic values are translated into
social wealth directly, through an adjustment in the contract price. This
consideration militates in favor of liberalizing the restrictions that constrain
contracting,21 8 but not necessarily in favor of establishing prohibitive
remedies as the preformulated rule. If specific performance comprised the
preformulated rule, contract prices would rise, foisting the price of
idiosyncratic values upon plaintiffs who may not have them, or who have
them but may not wish to pay for them, preferring more attractive
alternatives, and who thus would be perfectly content with a damages
remedy. 219
Finally, a preference for specific performance, restitution or injunctions
215. Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 559.
216. In an argument that mirrors that of Goetz and Scott in regard to liquidated damages, id.,
Professor Yorio asserts that a stronger moral case for full compensation to the plaintiff comes in the
context of a contract with a restoration clause, such as that at issue in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal &
Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962) (disallowing full remedial compensation where benefit was
minimal and clause was incidental to the contract), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963). Yorio, supra note
5, at 1393-94. Yorio argues that, to the extent that the contract price was raised to pay for the
restoration, plaintiff should get damages that include an amount devoted to the purchase of this
restoration. Id.
217. Consider the following example. Promisee desires a small parcel of land in his neighborhood
to use for an outdoor basketball court. The land has a market value of $1000; its use as a basketball
court will add $250 to its value. In order to induce delivery of the parcel, promisee offers to pay
promisor $1500 to sign a contract with a $5000 liquidated damages provision payable to promisee
should promisor breach. After the contract is signed but before the sale is consummated, a third party
offers promisor $2000 for the same parcel, planning to use it to expand his adjacent house, thereby
adding $4000 in value to the real estate. If promisee subjectively values the parcel at $5000, and thus
refuses to allow the promisor to purchase the contract back, then the third party's superior offer will
go unaccepted, even though promisor could have compensated promisee for his market loss of $250
with the gains, and even if the third party sweetens the deal closer to his profit margin. Delivery to
promisee allows him to enjoy his idiosyncratic, noncapitalizable value, at the expense of social gain.
218. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 6; Kronman, supra note 5.
219. As was argued with respect to the routine provision of restitution, see supra notes 105-113 and
accompanying text, ignoring utility can frustrate the goal of wealth maximization.
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may frustrate wealth maximization by hindering the defendant from the
"contracting-out" of risk." The efficiency presumably generated by
defendant's ability to contract out portions of risk hinges on the willingness
of specialists to accept that risk, seemingly a less desirable state of affairs
if the subcontract were specifically enforceable against the specialist.
Specific performance would thus render risk contracting or other liability
avoiding more costly for the defendant, and in some cases might supply the
plaintiff with a degree of security he would have preferred to avoid
purchasing. 22
D. Prohibitory Remedies May Frustrate Compensation
Another salient goal of the law of remedies is to provide compensation
to those who are injured. Obviously, to the extent that plaintiffs are careful
in their request for remedies, they presumably would choose the more
favorable remedy. Accordingly, where plaintiffs ask for a prohibitory
remedy, it is probably accurate to conclude that the prohibitory remedy
better compensates the plaintiff. But simply giving the plaintiff what the
plaintiff wants does not mean that the more general goal of providing
adequate compensation is fulfilled.
To illustrate, consider the problems the law has encountered in assessing
loss-based damages for "risk." Assume a mass tort case where a defendant,
by contaminating the water supply, has negligently exposed an entire
community to a known carcinogen: an exposure that will eventually cause
members of the community to contract cancer at a greater incidence than
would have occurred normally.'m Corrective justice would suggest, at a
minimum, that compensation be provided to those who contract cancer
from the exposure in an amount equal to their losses.' The element of
220. The phrase belongs to CHARLES 0. HARDY, RISK AND RsK-BEARINO 60-61 (1923). Hardy
borrows an example from Leon C. Marshall to illustrate:
I decide to build a house. A contractor assumes the task. He then proceeds to make sub-
contracts with the purveyors of lumber, bricks, and other materials to the effect that these
materials shall be delivered to him at a certain future time and at a certain price. The main
contractor has thus contracted himself out of risk with reference to price changes in these
materials .... True, the burden is merely transferred to someone else, but presumably this
someone else is a specialist, and therein is the social defense.
Id. at 61 (citing L.C. Marshall, Industrial Society 501-02 (1918)).
221. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
222. See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287 (NJ. 1987).
223. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Causation and Wrongdoing, 63 CI.-KENT L. REV. 407 (1987); Jules
L. Coleman, Corrective Justice and Wrongful Gain, II J. LEoAL STuD. 421 (1982). It appears that
Coleman's subsequent writings have developed the notion that corrective justice requires that the
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"actual injury" helps ensure corrective justice by denying standing to those
community members who would wish to sue immediately for the added
risk that has been inflicted upon them by the exposure. 4 If "actual
injury" were not required for standing, then all the citizens of the
community, not just those few who will actually contract cancer due to the
exposure, would have an incentive to sue for the risk.' Not enforcing
the traditional "injury" requirement could relegate those who eventually do
contract the cancer to a recovery equal to but a small fraction of their
actual harm. 6 In this way, the traditional element of "injury" provides
an attempted resolution to the problem of the "commons" or the "prisoner's
dilemma" that inheres in allocative decisions involving limited resources.
The "injury" element helps to ensure that these funds are distributed in a
way that obviates incentives to act self-interestedly to deplete the common
pool.
Like some mass tort suits, prohibitory remedies are directed at risk.
Injunctions do so explicitly, requiring uninjured plaintiffs to demonstrate
the "threat of injury."'' 7 Specific performance impliediy imposes the
same requirement, asking plaintiffs to prove that the performance desired
wrongdoer particularly be the source of amends. Ernest J. Weinnib, Non-Relational Relationships: A
Note on Coleman's New Theory, 77 IOWA L. REV. 445 (1992) [hereinafter Weinrib, Non-Relational
Relationship]; Emily Sherwin, Why Is Corrective Justice Just?, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 839
(1992).
224. Ayers, 525 A.2d at 307 (stating that a risk suit "exposes the tort system ... to the task of
litigating vast numbers of claims for compensation based on threats of injuries that may never occur").
225. It is not entirely obvious that "actual injury" provides an unmitigated benefit to ensuring
compensation; although the defendant's monies are saved for plaintiffs who contract the cancer, the
delay in bringing the action brought about by denying recovery for risk may give rise to substantial
problems of proof. See id. at 316 (Handler, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("Because of
limitations in current scientific knowledge and because of the number and variety of toxic chemicals
involved, the victims of this toxic exposure were unable to measure or quantify the enhancement of
their risk of disease.'). The law of remedies provides for the employment ofprohibitive remedies where
the damages remedy might be "inadequate" due to causation problems. See infra notes 291-93 and
accompanying text; 1 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 2.5(2).
226. It might be possible, despite estoppel, that the plaintiffs who do recover for "risk" could sue
again for the actual harm when they contract cancer. As a practical matter, however, this latter recovery
might be unavailable, as the defendant could be bankrupt, or could have taken steps, through settlement
agreements, to preclude such a possibility.
227. Laycock, Injunctions, supra note 5, at 1075 ("[A]II injunctions ... [are] a future-oriented
remedy."). Plaintiff's risk of injury is not treated as seriously by courts as is an actual injury sufficient
to give rise to a claim for damages. Injunctions can be denied where the effect of the injunction is to
cause excessive harm to the defendant, unlike a damages action where the fact that the amount of
damages might cause excessive harm to the defendant is not used as a basis for denial of the requested
relief. This different treatment shows the caution with which the courts treat claims for relief based on
risk.
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is sufficiently "unique" that they should not be compelled to undertake the
risk of inadequate substitution at the market. Even the restitutionary
remedies obviate risk indirectly by, in effect, ordering rescission of the deal
that caused plaintiff harm, 8 thus not compelling plaintiff to undertake
the financial risk of locating a replacement purchaser in the market. These
remedies act prophylactically, seeking to protect the plaintiff against actual
injury.
Because prohibitory remedies aim to eliminate plaintiff's risk, they
facilitate the depletion of the common pool by self-interest. In the mass tort
case mentioned above, if the first plaintiff who sues is awarded a
prohibitory remedy (most likely, in this case, a restitutionary disgorgement
of the defendant's profits from the wrongdoing), then the common pool
will be emptied more quickly than otherwise, with fewer dollars left for
distribution to other victims. Further, the availability of a prohibitory
remedy will attract plaintiffs to deplete the pool.
Other prohibitory remedies similarly tend to diminish the common pool
in multiple-plaintiff cases. For example, a remedy of restitution to one
creditor of a bankrupt tends to diminish the recovery of other creditors.229
An award of specific performance to one buyer puts that buyer at a
competitive advantage over other buyers who are relegated to damages and
must seek cover. An injunction awarded to one plaintiff incurs expenditures
by the defendant which may shrink the size of the potential recovery pool
for other victims or may preclude legal and productive behavior by the
defendant which would have inured to the benefit of some third party. In
addition, the injunction presents administrative costs to the taxpayers, a
public good of which the plaintiff avails himself for free.23° In this sense,
prohibitory remedies mirror the problem of punitive damages in the context
of mass tort cases, tending to diminish the compensation available to
others."' Thus, not only do prohibitory remedies not contribute to the
228. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 32, §4.3(6) ("A rescission is an avoidance of a transaction.").
229. See Kossian v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 225 (Ct. App. 1967) (holding that
plaintiff may recover in restitution from a bankrupt). But see In re North Am. Coin & Currency, Ltd.,
767 F.2d 1573 (holding conversely, citing reasons of bankruptcy policy), modified, 774 F.2d 1390 (9th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1083 (1986).
230. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
231. See Juzwin v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 705 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J.) (holding that, in asbestos
action, due process violation resulted from multiple punitive damages awards in part because of threat
of depleting assets available to other plaintiffs), vacated, 718 F. Supp. 1233 (D.N. 1989) (holding it
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solution of the common pool problem, as do market damages limited to
"actual injury," but prohibitory remedies add to the incentives to exploit the
pool, frustrating compensation to the injured.
Prohibitory remedies may not cause a drain on the common pool of
recoverable assets where the possibility of liability will lead potential
defendants to demand higher prices for undertaking risks. For example, the
effect of allowing specific performance in the context of a common pool
might not be significant because, in theory, the seller who is faced with the
prospect of strict performance could simply charge more for the good.
Thus, when the performance is mandated after breach, the plaintiff does not
deplete the common fund, but instead takes back only his contribution. In
theory, other prohibitory remedies might also produce a general rise in the
cost of doing business, thus compensating the defendant ex ante for the
larger liability the defendant faces, and also generating a larger pool to
compensate the injured.
Although common pools may grow under a regime of prohibitory
remedies, the effect of prohibitory remedies on compensation would not
necessarily be neutral. Charging adequate prices to accommodate remedies
that are fundamentally based on risk may present a substantially more
difficult task than under the "actual injury" standard that is the foundation
of the damages remedy. Actual injury occurs as the occasional culmination
of risk-taking; risk, however, seems more limitless, and thus less easy to
capture in a price. A car traveling at excessive speed creates numerous risks
to pedestrians, cars, and other property, all of which risks could form the
basis of a suit. It would appear difficult for an insurance firm, for example,
to set aside a pool of money adequate to compensate plaintiffs for the costs
of the infinite risks that the insured driver might regularly create. 2 The
problem of foreseeability appears sufficiently substantial to suggest that the
move to prohibitory remedies, which protect against risk, will not have a
neutral effect on the maintenance of compensation pools, and will thus tend
to effect a redistribution of compensation from those actually injured to
those who remain uninjured in the traditional sense, but who bear risk
unwillingly.
232. This problem of ensuring against risk, and not merely the resultant harms, faces insurers who
would attempt to insure for safety expenditures that minimize risk. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Armco,
Inc , 822 F.2d 1348, 1353 (4th Cir. 1987) ("Insurers are very reluctant to cover what are essentially
prophylactic measures, such as safety precautions, for the obvious reason that such expenditures are
subject to the discretion of the insured, and are not connected with any harm to specific third parties.'),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1008 (1988); see also Continental Ins. Cos. v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., Inc., 842 F.2d 977 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 821 (1988).
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E. Summary
The critics of the damages remedy have disparaged its perceived failures
in meeting the goals of remedial law, but have overlooked the multiple
shortcomings of the alternative. Prohibitory remedies promise to do worse:
their clumsiness renders them inapt to expand deterrence, and even with
sagacious employment they appear systematically to either underdeter or
overdeter, haphazardly. Even worse, prohibitory remedies may actually
increase the incidence of undesirable risk-taking, as their widespread use
threatens to diminish the "teaching" function of remedies and to create a
"moral hazard" that promises either to neutralize any supposed gains in
deterrence or actually to diminish incentives to take care. Prohibitory
remedies do not promise to offset this threatened decline in deterrence by
an increase in social wealth; instead, their very aim at protecting idiosyn-
cratic values indicates that their wider employment will frustrate wealth
maximization. Finally, these troublesome costs of prohibitory remedies do
not appear to be offset by gains in providing full compensation. Although
individual plaintiffs are better off with the remedy they prefer, to the extent
that defendants are understood to possess a "common pool" of funds that
is available to those who are injured, prohibitory remedies, founded upon
a limitless concept of risk, promise to an unusual extent to diminish that
pool at the expense of others who deserve compensation.
IV. CORRECTIVE JUSTICE, PARETO SUPERIORITY,
INCOMMENSURABILITY AND THE DISTRIBUTIVE GOAL OF FULL
COMPENSATION
The prohibitory remedies offered as a means to achieve full compensa-
tion would fail to fulfill the various goals of remedial law any better than
does the prevailing damages remedy, and might in some instances actually
do worse. Nevertheless, simply pointing out the practical shortcomings of
the alternative does not alone supply a full justification for a particular
preference. This Part examines the particular problems that the legal
system's preference for apparently undercompensatory remedies creates for
normative conceptions of justice, and argues that a preference for damages
is just.
There are three related normative positions that might censure the legal
system's preference for the damages remedy: corrective justice, Pareto
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superiority, and the requirement of commensurability.233 The phrase
"corrective justice" refers to the Aristotelian conception that those
wrongfully harmed ought to be compensated, usually by the wrongdo-
er.235 Corrective justice presents some problems for the justification of the
damages remedy, for it suggests that compensation should be fully
adequate, annulling the entire "wrongful loss.'" 6 This claim in favor of
full compensation as a corollary of corrective justice is consistent with the
economic notion of Pareto superiority, which precludes rendering a plaintiff
unwillingly worse off for the benefit of another. 7 Another related
criticism of damages remedies arises because of the obvious
incommensurability between dollars and personal suffering. 8 Similar
normative arguments pervade the literature that argues for prohibitory
remedies. 9 The essence of these criticisms is that plaintiffs should be
233. Other terms have been employed to address what is basically the same issue. See, e.g., Radin,
supra note 5, at 57, 77-85 (discussing the preference for substitutionary damages in terms of the
"commodification" of personal or property interests).
234. For some useful treatments of corrective justice, see generally Richard A. Posner, The Concept
of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 187 (1981) (arguing that
corrective justice is an expression of the economic theory of tort law because both require rectification
and distributive neutrality); Weinrib, Non-Relational Relationships, supra note 223 (linking plaintiff's
right to compensation with defendant's obligation to compensate); Coleman, supra note 223 (separating
the requirements of corrective justice from any particular mode of rectification); Jules Coleman, Tort
Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992) (same). Compare Jules L.
Coleman, The Mixed Conception of Corrective Justice, 77 IowA L. REv. 427 (1992) (developing a
theory of justice that provides some support for a mode of rectification that requires the wrongdoer to
be the source of compensation), with JULES L. COLEMAN, RisKs AND WRONGS (1992) (arguing that
corrective justice requires wrongdoer liability) and Jules L. Coleman, Risks and Wrongs, 15 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 637 (1992) (same).
235. Corrective justice may also include some utilitarian considerations. See Posner, supra note 234,
at 197.
236. See Coleman, supra note 223.
237. See generally JULES L. COLEMAN, MARKETS, MORAtS AND THE LAW 95-105 (1988). Some
commentators have tried to reconcile the obviously incomplete compensation provided by money
damrages with the Pareto criterion by hypothesizing that unanimity is met ex ante. In other words, the
loss from incomplete compensation is fictitious because the plaintiff was compensated by the reduced
price he paid for the good, be it a contractual service or the cost of precautions. See generally Anthony
T. Kronman, Wealth Maximization as a Normative Principle, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 227, 236-38 (1980).
Others have said that Pareto unanimity implies full compensation as the plaintiff would define it,
rendering dubious the claim that wealth maximization ensures Pareto unanimity. See generally Ronald
M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191 (1980) (arguing wealth is at best an ingredient
of value, but is not coterminous with value). The text classifies the Pareto condition as "normative" in
keeping with Judge Posner's argument on the debated issue. See Posuer, supra note 234.
238. See Radin, supra note 5; Sunstein, supra note 5, at 843-46.
239. See, e.g., Linzer, supra note 2, at 111 ("It seems right that people who make fair bargains
should be held to them."); id. at 138 ("[[it is simply right that one get what he was promised.').
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allocated full compensation, or commensurable compensation, because they
deserve it.
Plaintiffs do not appear to have an unqualified moral claim to full
compensation. Although the legal system properly strives in a general way
to facilitate compensation, the traditional reliance on admittedly incommen-
surate compensation in the form of money damages, based on loss in tort
or on expectation in contract,24 evidences that the law's commitment to
full compensation has historically been less than complete. This perceived
failure may have been informed by motives other than pecuniousness or
distributive favoritism.24 The law's historical reluctance to pursue the
goal of full compensation more completely may result from the inadequacy
of the vehicle that the law has available to accomplish complete compensa-
tion: prohibitory remedies. Prohibitory remedies may award a particular
plaintiff full and commensurable compensation, but they do so at a cost to
the public. These costs take several forms: the administrative costs of
prohibitory remedies;242 the deleterious effects on such important social
concerns as risk management,2 43 undesirable risk encouragement,2' and
otherwise effective deterrence;2 4 and the frustration of the public goals
of wealth creation246 and compensating the injured.247 In short, prohibi-
tory remedies, the means by which commensurability may be achieved, are
in part a good supplied by the public.
The claim of plaintiff to a prohibitory remedy as a vehicle for full
compensation may be morally unattractive to the extent that prohibitory
240. Even the expectation measure, although designed to put the plaintiff in the same position as
if the defendant had performed the contract, YoRio, supra note 84, § 1.21, sometimes fails to achieve
full compensation, see Schwartz, supra note 5, at 276; Daniel A. Farber, Reassessing the Economic
Efficiency of Compensatory Damages for Breach of Contract, 66 VA. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (1980)
(arguing that damage remedies for consumer contracts tend to undercompensate).
241. The traditional concerns cited as militating against compensating plaintiffs for their
idiosyncratic losses were the prospect of"economic waste" stemming from compensating plaintiffmore
than the value of the harm, see Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1172-74; Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal &
Mining Co., 382 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 906 (1963); Plante v. Jacobs, 103
N.W.2d 296 (Wis. 1960); and concerns over the certainty and foresceability of damages, see, e.g.,
Timothy J. Mudis, Cost of Completion or Diminution in Market Value: The Relevance of Subjective
Value, 12 J. LEGAL STuD. 379, 382-84 (1983) (arguing that these considerations should not prevent
some recognition of subjective values).
242. See supra notes 54-70 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
244. See supra notes 164-91 and accompanying text.
245. See supra notes 130-55 and accompanying text.
246. See supra notes 192-221 and accompanying text.
247. See supra notes 222-32 and accompanying text.
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remedies constitute an irrevocable transfer of wealth from the community
to the plaintiff.24 Although the moral position of the plaintiff against the
defendant militates in favor of full compensation,249 the moral imperative
seems less compelling when that claim is against the community, equally
blameless or perhaps itself victimized by the defendant's wrong." ° In
addition, at times the claim for prohibitory remedies may come at the
expense of other plaintiffs."' Thus, denial of plaintiff's moral claim for
fuller compensation does not necessarily rest on the frank utilitarianism of
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, 52 nor is satisfying plaintiff's request a require-
ment of Paretian unanimity. Rather, the moral positions of the plaintiff who
makes the request for fuller compensation and the community that
impliedly, through extant legal limitations, resists it seem deontologically
in equipoise, and the resolution of this dilemma lies within the sphere of
distributive concerns, not as an imperative of corrective justice. In other
words, although the public may decide to become the "excess insurer"
against all harms from inadequate compensation, it does not appear that
corrective justice necessitates the public doing so." The public may wish
to provide full compensation, but the imperatives of remedial law do not
dictate that the law of remedies be the vehicle for that fulfillment.
248. See infra notes 254-57 and accompanying text. Because prescriptive remedies are bestowed
at public expense, and not just at defendant's expense, the absence of high transactions costs does not
alone provide a reason to employ them. Cf Muris, supra note 241, at 381 ("[U]niqueness is another
way of stating that the cost to a court of evaluating the proper substitutes is not worth the effort.");
Kronman, supra note 5, at 358-65 (arguing that "uniqueness" rule keeps courts from wasting resources
seeking a market value where none is readily available); Schwartz, supra note 5, at 274-75 (same).
249. See Yorio, supra note 5, at 1393-94.
250. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Toward a Moral Theory of Negligence Law, 2 LAw & PHIL. 37, 39
(1983); Posner, supra note 234, at 197. But see Coleman, supra note 223, at 436-40.
251. See supra notes 222-32 and accompanying text.
252. See Linzer, supra note 2, at 114-15 (stating that the "Kaldor-Hicks Compensation Principle
. posits that a benefit to one individual, even if it carries with it a loss to another, increases society's
welfare so long as the benefited party is able fully to compensate the losing party and to remain better
off than before").
253. Professor Coleman has been a proponent of the view that corrective justice does not require
that tortious defendants necessarily pay for the harms they cause where they have not enjoyed wrongful
gain. He has not argued that the obligation to pay should be imposed, as a matter of corrective justice,
on unwilling and innocent third parties. Rather, Coleman has suggested that compensation could be
achieved by taxing the negligent, regardless of the fortuity of harm, by first-party insurance, or by some
voluntary arrangement involving social insurance. See Coleman, supra note 223, at 438-39. It would
seem, however, that to place liability for recompense on the community in some way should require
unanimous consent, else one would appear to be imposing a cost upon an innocent against his will;
unless, of course, one finds the expansive notions of ex ante compensation articulated by Judge Posner
and others attractive. See Posner, supra note 234, at 198-99.
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Nor is it clear, as a matter of corrective justice, that defendants ought to
be separated from their gain in order to make compensation commensura-
ble. When they take and pay under the prevailing market damages
remedies, defendants add to the quantum of social wealth. Their rent-
seeking effectively capitalizes on some measure of plaintiff's idiosyncratic
valuations: a plaintiff whose opportunity cost to replace a particular good
was 10, but whose idiosyncratic valuations led him to value the good at 15,
will get but 10 from a defendant who stands to profit from the item at
12.5 If defendant's added value of 2 is converted into wealth, either by
reselling the good at 12 or by using it to produce other goods in a way that
the good adds more than 10 in value to the produced good, then the
defendant has added 2 to social wealth.5 In this case, the plaintiff may
have been "wronged" in the abstract sense of being required to make a
sacrifice of his idiosyncratic valuation for the common good, but it is not
clear that the defendant, as the social agent of harm-infliction, is the person
who has committed the wrong 56 The defendant who tortiously takes and
pays appears no more morally blameworthy than others whose self-interest
the legal system relies upon to produce social benefits, such as criminal
defendants who request the exclusion of evidence, plaintiffs who bring qui
tam actions, or plaintiffs who seek trebled or punitive damages or
attorney's fees. The principal cannot term the obedient conduct of its agent
"wrongful." Thus, if defendant's conduct is not "wrongful," then the
essential requirement that would impose prohibitory remedies as a matter
of corrective justice is absent: the decision of whether or not to compensate
plaintiffs for their lost idiosyncratic valuations is a distributive, public
question. 7
254. It is important to limit plaintiff's compensation to plaintiff's opportunity cost, the market
price, in order to encourage defendants to act in a profit-producing manner. See Merrill, supra note 196,
at 82-83 (analyzing the takings clause as encouraging profit-maximizing uses of land).
255. By finding better uses for the good, the defendant has, in effect, usefully expanded the
"frontier" of possible Pareto-superiority, or reduced transactions costs, which may be the same thing.
See Calabresi, supra note 85.
256. Of course, the fact that the defendant maybe innocent of wrongdoing does not mean that the
plaintiffnecessarily should go uncompensated for the "idiosyncratic harms" plaintiffbears for the social
good. Rather, the analysis does suggest that the adjustment of plaintiff's position proceed not as a
matter of corrective justice, but as a matter of distributive justice. The distributive question is whether
to treat idiosyncratic harms as legally recognized harms, or instead to leave them noncompensable. Once
the harm is deemed legally compensable, then the actual configuration of the remedy comprises an
expression of corrective justice.
257. See Ken Kress, Formalism, Corrective Justice and Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. at i, ii (1992)
("[D]istributive justice leaves open what the criterion of distribution of the benefit or burden is, whether
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Setting to one side the utilitarian justification for allowing defendants to
capitalize the idiosyncratic valuations of plaintiffs, 5 there are other
reasons to doubt that defendants' gain under the take-and-pay system
created by market remedies should be deemed "wrongful." Consider the
situation where, at first blush, it seems that defendant's moral claim to be
relegated to a damages remedy is suspect: where the defendant has chosen
to breach a contract to sell an item to one party, the plaintiff, in order to
gain greater profits from sale to another. In this case, plaintiff's moral
claim to specific performance of the contract seems to be founded on the
entirely moral proposition that one ought to keep one's promises. Similarly,
defendant's moral claim to avoid performance seems to be founded on the
rather immoral proposition that one ought not to keep one's promises.
It is not entirely clear, however, that defendants in this case deserve to
have their profits disgorged. The moral assessment that one ought to keep
one's promises implies an inquiry into what was promised. It would seem,
in commercial contexts at least, that a party promising to deliver goods may
be promising to deliver unless another offer comes along that allows the
seller to pay damages to the buyer and to profit from the third party
transaction. 9 Because buyers are often sellers, both parties may prefer
this rule ex ante because it provides flexibility in changing market
conditions and allows for rapid profitmaking where prices climb quick-
ly. 260
on the basis of equality, or merit, or need, or class, or height Thus, distributive justice requires a
political decision to fix the criterion of distribution.") (citations omitted). By contrast, "[flormalism
maintains that the normativity inherent in action fully explains corrective justice, and, thus, private law."
Id
258. Importantly, the common law encouraged defendants to take and pay only if they planned to
capitalize some part of plaintiff's idiosyncratic valuation into social wealth. If defendant in the above
example sought to obtain the item for the defendant's personal idiosyncratic gain, and thus the consumer
surplus of 2 is not "realized" in the market, then the transaction is neutral in terms of wealth creation,
and actually harmed plaintiff for no good reason. The common law of remedies dealt with the
"nonrealizing defendant differently from the "realizing" defendant, and would in the case of the
idiosyncratic, "nonrealizing" defendant utilize prohibitory remedies. The common law did this in a
general way by virtue of the rule that prohibitory remedies would be reserved for where the converted
good was "unique" or its replaceability "inadequate." Where the item had no ready market or substitute,
and the defendant most likely was unable or uninterested in realizing a marketable gain in the
transaction, the law would impose some prohibitory remedy, such as replevin, restitution, or specific
performance, to discourage nonrealizmg take-and-pay transactions. See infra notes 281-307 and
accompanying text.
259. See Yorio, supra note 5, at 1371-72.
260. See Kronman, supra note 5, at 369 ("[P]romisors and promisees will typically favor a money
damages rule if the subject matter of their contract is not unique."). See also supra notes 85-90 and
accompanying text.
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The harder case for the defendant's moral status involves the defendant
who has profited from a fraud. Where the defendant's profits stem from a
fraud against one to whom the defendant owed a fiduciary duty, then the
case for restitution of profits appears incontestable.26' It must be noted,
however, that the case for restitution is strongest precisely because the
restitutionary award here mirrors the compensatory award that should be
available in damages: the plaintiff was entitled to a fiduciary who acted in
plaintiff's interests by seeking profits, and defendant's failure to so act
cheated plaintiff out of profits.262 Apart from a breach of fiduciary duty
case, it does not appear that the fraudulent defendant stands in a fundamen-
tally different moral position than does the defendant who breaches a
contract. It is difficult to perceive any moral difference between the
defendant who fraudulently induces a party to sign a contract and one who
intentionally breaches a contract recently entered in good faith. Both have
intentionally harmed the property interests of another for profit and so both
appear to deserve the same moral consequences.263 Even everyday
commercial activity reflects the same degree of moral ambiguity as does
the defendant guilty of fraud.2" Our legal system forgives many who
261. See Friedmann, supra note 5, at 552-53; 1 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 4.5(3).
262. The cases extend farther, holding fiduciaries liable for profits even where the profits would
not have gone to the principal. See Mosser v. Darrow, 341 U.S. 267 (1951); Pratt v. Shell Petroleum
Corp., 100 F.2d 833 (10th Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 306 U.S. 659 (1939).
263. Both the fraudulent inducer and the efficient contract breaker have told a lie at the time the
contract was signed: the inducer lied about the truth of one of the provisions of the contract, while the
breaker lied about the truth of keeping his promise. A small distinction may be that the inducer has lied
twice (about a provision in the contract and about his signature) while the breaker has lied but once
(about his signature). Nevertheless, the moral positions of the inducer and the breaker appear to be
deontologically equivalent.
A somewhat plausible justification for the law's perduring distinction between fraud and breach may
be found in a utilitarian perspective. Here it is a question of timing. The inducer possesses the
undisclosed information prior to entering the agreement. Thus, the inducer's profit is "wrongful"
because in forming the contract he does not create or capitalize on new information, and thus does not
add to social wealth. With efficient breach, the information is discovered after the agreement is entered.
Remedying the breach here with the less onerous payment of compensatory damages effectively rewards
the breaker, giving him incentives to locate new information and to use it profitably. Rewarding the
fraudulent inducer in the same manner is unwise because the inducer does not create or capitalize on
new information, but rather profits from falsity or from disvaluing information. Cf. PosNmt, supra note
6, § 4.6 (arguing that fraud is illegal because it encourages a positive investment in misinformation).
264. Assume that, on average, two construction workers die every time a building over twenty
stories is erected, even if the contractor follows all prescribed safety practices. It seems safe to assume
that the contractor who undertakes to build such a building, and indeed the owner who procures it,
either knows or should know of the risk involved in the construction. Yet the project is undertaken, and
two die. Has this defendant in constructing this building committed the crime of manslaughter, thus
indicating that the profits from the construction ought to be disgorged? Or has he acted lawfully, and
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knowingly harm others for profit, or relegates their victims to a pricing
remedy. It seems insupportable that the outcome should change when
conduct that appears indistinguishable from a moral standpoint is termed
"fraud."
Labeling the desire to give plaintiffs full compensation a requirement of
corrective justice, or its related notions of Pareto unanimity or
commensurability, simply masks its fundamentally distributive character.
This redefinition of the goal of full compensation from a matter of
"mathematical justice," to use Aristotle's terms, to one of distributive
justice is not to suggest that communities must continue to refuse to
allocate community funds, in the form of prohibitory remedies, to those
who lose idiosyncratic values to tortfeasing defendants. Indeed, these
idiosyncratic victims can attempt to fashion a claim on the social fisc, in
connection with other pressing claims of victimhood, that seeks to convince
the community to forgo wealth for the sake of some other value.
Most fundamentally, the decision of the community whether or not to
compensate plaintiffs for their lost idiosyncratic values should be undertak-
en through the law of liability rather than the law of remedies, because it
is in the law of liability where distributive concerns are customarily
addressed. The law of liability, however, presents several reasons that
suggest that idiosyncratic values should not fall within law's domain. One
set of reasons concern the proof problems in establishing the requisite
"injury": courts may be uncertain that idiosyncratic values exist 26 and
may have difficulty in valuing them.2" Another set of concerns about
idiosyncratic values has led to the development of substantive limitations
on the liability of defendants, through such doctrines as the rule in Hadley
simply suffered two unfortunate "accidents"? Although lawyers may hide behind doctrines of specific
intent and, in other contexts, "product defect," the moral equation appears unchanged. Regardless of
the fact that assumption of risk supplies a defense to a tort but not to a crime, the defendant has chosen
to engage in personally profitable activity knowing that others will suffer for it. The same can be said
of virtually any manufacturer of automobiles and most other consumer goods, and in regard to anyone
who drives a car. Like the defendant guilty of fraud, all know when initiating these activities that they
are adding risk to the lives and health of others.
265. See Muis, supra note 241, at 382-84; Evergreen Amusement Corp. v. Milstead, 112 A.2d 901
(Md. 1955) (holding a new business' profits too uncertain). See generally CHARLES T. McCORMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES ch. 4 (1935).
266. See Kronman, supra note 5, at 363 (arguing that "the magnitude of this risk [of
undercompensation] is inversely related to the completeness and reliability of the information on which
the court bases its award'). Contracting parties may attempt to widen the quantum of relief for a legally
cognizable harm by agreeing to a liquidated damages provision. Enforcing these agreements would
allow parties to protect idiosyncratic harms most easily. Goetz & Scott, supra note 6, at 568-77.
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v. Baxendale in contract2 67 and proximate causation in tort.26' Finally,
the perduring problem of idiosyncratic valuations has generated doctrines
that have the effect of assigning liability to the plaintiff, such as the
doctrine of avoidable consequences. 2 69 As the location of these lines that
allocate liability between parties evolve over time, occasionally categories
of idiosyncratic harm are given legal protection. 70 By examining the
question of full compensation as a matter of the law of liability, the whole
question of the initial entitlement of rights and obligation that is an
essential question of distributive justice may be addressed directly, without
the analytical encumbrance of the mistaken presumption that full compensa-
tion, as it is understood by the proponents of prohibitory remedies, is
required as a matter of corrective justice.
V. TOWARD A JUSTIFICATION FOR PROHIBITORY REMEDIES
Contrary to the common wisdom, prohibitory remedies do not necessarily
provide the enhanced deterrence they promise. Because gain frequently
does not correspond with loss, and in fact is likely not to correspond in
precisely those cases where the plaintiff prefers a gain-based recovery to a
loss-based one, prohibitory remedies tend to provide a clumsy method of
deterrence.27' Moreover, the difficulty of their administration7 and
their undesirable behavioral effects2" create doubt whether the routine
employment of prohibitory remedies would enhance deterrence at all.
Finally, prohibitory remedies may frustrate the other important remedial
goals of wealth maximization274 and ensuring compensation. 5 In short,
267. 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (Ex. Ch. 1854) (limiting defendant's liability because "such loss would
neither have flowed naturally from the breach of this contract in the great multitude of such cases
occurring under ordinary circumstances," nor was it specially communicated).
268. Palsgrafv. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (stating that negligence unlimited
by proximate causation "would entail liability for any and all consequences, however novel or
extraordinary").
269. Munn v. Southern Health Plan, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 525 (N.D. Miss. 1989) (deciding not to
exempt plaintiff's refusal to accept a blood transfusion on religious grounds from "objectively
reasonable" test of doctrine of avoidable consequences; the thin-skull rule applies only for physical
conditions).
270. See generally McCoRMIcK, supra note 265, at 2-3. How these legally protected interests are
compensated also signifies the importance of the legal protection. See, e.g., Memphis Community
School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (finding no compensable value, independent of tortious
injury, arising from due process violation).
271. See supra notes 133-55 and accompanying text.
272. See supra notes 60-65 and accompanying text.
273. See supra notes 156-91 and accompanying text.
274. See supra notes 192-221 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 222-32 and accompanying text.
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prohibitory remedies appear to constitute rather unsatisfactory remedial
options, suggesting that their employment ought to be limited, not
expanded.
Yet prohibitory remedies do have a place in a system in which damages
remedies appropriately predominate. Providing a rationale for the
employment of prohibitory remedies begins with understanding them as one
part of a larger family of remedies and other legal doctrines. This larger
family shares the common end of removing certain goods or interests from
the take-and-pay system. If this larger end is justifiable, then prohibitory
remedies present a legitimate tool for remedial law; the remaining
objections go to the efficacy of prohibitory remedies at accomplishing this
end. This Part attempts to articulate a coherent and limitable purpose for
the employment of prohibitory remedies and a legal principle that captures
that purpose.
Although harms are not intrinsically good, society does sometimes
literally profit when defendants "harm" others' idiosyncracies for the sake
of personal gain, as long as their gain is sufficient to pay compensatory
damages to the victim. This harsh reality produces a benefit because of the
community gain in wealth that derives from the "realizing" of defendant's
conversion of plaintiff's idiosyncratic values into capital assets, usable or
saleable by the defendant at a price in excess of the prevailing market
price.276 In a sense, the realizing defendant acts as a market-maker, taking
advantage of time lags in the movement of price or creating the movement
through his own industry.27 7 The community's interest in the take-and-pay
system explains the broad and historic preference of the common law for
damages remedies over the alternative prohibitory remedy that might
276. This justification differs from the standard "economic analysis" that posits transactions costs
as the reason why prescriptive remedies are not regularly employed. See Calabresi & Melamed, supra
note 2 1, at 1093-98; Calabresi, supra note 85, at 1222-23. Transactions cost analysis has been the focus
of much of the debate, with commentators disagreeing over whether damages or specific performance,
for example, supply the more efficient "pre-breach" and "post-breach" bargaining context. See Goetz
& Scott, supra note 6; Schwartz, supra note 5; Kronman, supra note 5; Linzer, supra note 2. The
standard economic justification of the damages remedy, that it is the better choice given prohibitive
transactions costs, appears a rather backhanded one; lacking empirical evidence, it seems insufficient
to provide a full account for the historical dominance of damages remedies. By contrast, the textual
justification, if correct, would supply a reason for favoring damages remedies, regardless of relative
transactions costs, on the grounds that the traditional preference better produces aggregate social wealth.
Posner, Utilitarianism, supra note 192, at 127; Johnsen, supra note 192, at 265.
277. This "market-making" function might also usefully bethought ofas "frontier-expanding." See
Calabresi, supra note 85.
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discourage defendants from creating social wealth."'
Prohibitory remedies remain valuable and needed remedies, even within
a system which, for reasons of the social good, limits their use. Prohibitory
remedies are needed because, in some cases, market damages will be
inadequate to provide the level of deterrence necessary to ensure that
defendants take and pay only when it is socially desirable that they do
SO. 2 79 Socially desirable taking and paying occurs when defendants move
the market price: compensating plaintiffs at prevailing prices,2"' but
utilizing the good at a more profitable level, converts socially valueless
idiosyncratic values into aggregate social wealth. If, however, the damages
that defendants expect to pay is something less than the market price, then
the defendants might inflict harm for no social profit, and indeed perhaps
278. But see Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 21, at 1124-27 (arguing that property rules should
be favored whenever transactions costs would not prohibit a bargain). Calabresi and Melamed's
suggestion would impose needless transactions costs. If society has evidenced a disinclination, through
its judicial decisions and other expressions of law, to allow (in most cases) idiosyncratic values to stand
in the way of aggregated wealth maximization, then allowing a plaintiff to refuse to accede to a socially
profitable bargain, or to extract some measure of defendant's gain and to create wasteful transactions
costs, seems contradictory. Calabresi and Melamed's position assumes, without explanation, that
property rules should form the preferred underlying rule, with liability as the exception. This
unarticulated assumption is revealed in their explication of criminal penalties as providing "an
undefinable kicker which represents society's need to keep all property rules from being changed at will
into liability rules." Id. at 1126. They do not say how we are to define what interests deserve this
kicker, by dint of a property rule, in the first instance, again suggesting that all interests that can be
protected by a property rule without causing "undue expense," id. at 1127, should be so protected. This
Article suggests that property rules should only be employed where defendants would act in socially
deleterious ways. See infra notes 281-307 and accompanying text.
279. The proposition that society benefits from defendants who take and pay, and the broader theory
of optimal deterrence, are based on the assumption that wrongdoers are rational, at least in the limited
sense that they would prefer to have $100 over $10. To the extent that wrongdoers are "irrational" and
prefer to be worse off, damages do not serve adequately to deter. This first assumption underlies the
broad range of penalties, both criminal and civil, that create marginal deterrence against more harmful
behaviors. It implies a certain belief in the ability to make interpersonal comparisons of utility, which
Lord Robbins has told us is impossible. LIONEL ROBBINs, AN ESSAY ON THE NATURE AND
SIGNIFICANCE OF ECONOMIC SCIENCE 139-41 (2d ed. 1935). However, the law depends on certain
common denominators of utility so pervasively, in deterring and compensating, as to render all lawyers
practical atheists to Robbins' view. For example, the very idea of imprisoning the guilty as a means of
deterrence, retribution or something else suggests a certain intersubjective understanding of the harm
of a denial of liberty, both intrinsically and commensurately. Thus, the best response to the radical
subjectivism outlined by Lawson, supra note 108, or the notions developed in the various "criticalist"
writings that evidence equal anti-positivism, see Jeffrey Standen, Note, Critical Legal Studies as an
Anti-Positivist Phenomenon, 72 VA. L. REV. 983 (1986), is to make the case for the common utilities,
such as wealth and liberty. See Johnsen, supra note 192.
280. There are other aspects of damages that should be included in the damages paid to plaintiff.
From a social wealth point of view, these damages ought to include payment for the social volatility,
if any, that is produced by the defendant's actions in converting a property right.
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at a social detriment. The taking by these "nonrealizing" defendants is
socially undesirable, and must be deterred.
Damages will provide inadequate deterrence where the probability of
enforcement is low.281 Adequate deterrence relies upon the expected
penalty, which is the average penalty in magnitude multiplied by the
probability of its imposition.2  Thus, if a substantial number of victims
of wrongdoing do not seek redress, then deterrence will be inadequate. For
example, if a certain tort is always remedied by $100,000 damages, but
only one in ten victims sue in court (or take other steps) to collect those
damages, then the wrongdoer's expected penalty is but $10,000. This
limited penalty would induce the wrongdoer to commit the wrong where
his expected gain is as low as $11,000. In other words, low enforcement
rates will actually induce potential defendants to cause harm where it is
socially undesirable to do so, here causing a $90,000 harm ($100,000 -
$10,000) for a $1,000 gain. Generally, in classes of wrongs where the
enforcement or detection rate is substantially less than one, some means of
increasing the expected penalty in order to ensure adequate systemic
deterrence is needed.
The law has a large family of remedial and substantive devices that serve
to increase the expected penalty where doing so is required to assist
plaintiffs in enforcing their damages claims, thus increasing the expected
penalty. Inadequate detection or enforcement is likely to be present in three
categories of cases. First, inadequate enforcement may occur where the
defendant's action has injured many victims, each in such small degree that
individual suits do not appear profitable. This pervasive problem is usually
addressed through such devices as class action suits, statutory trebled
damages, and exemplary or punitive damages.8 3 Second, inadequate
281. In theory, harm-based damages should always be adequate to deter, except when its most
problematic underlying assumption, that enforcement rates will be closely coextensive with harm, is
false. See Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L.
RFv. 1, 9 (1982). When enforcement rates are adequate, as they should be in most tort and contract
cases, then harm-based remedies are adequate to deter activity that causes more harm than good. When
enforcement rates are inadequate, as they might frequently be in cases of the type outlined in the text,
see infra notes 283-90 and accompanying text, then it is safe to assume that harm-based damages will
fail to deter, and thus are inadequate to address the wrong at bar.
282. See Gary Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. EcON. 169, 170-
80 (1968).
283. See generally Ellis, supra note 281, at 23-26 (discussing the efficient use of punitive damages);
Kenneth S. Abraham & John C. Jeffries, Jr., Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of
Defendant's Wealth, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 415, 418-19 (1989). Given the incentive contingent-fee lawyers
have to seek out plaintiffs and form class actions, one might wonder whether a concern about
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enforcement may occur where wrongful conduct has caused definite harm,
but in a manner particularly difficult to unravel after the fact. The pollution
of a stream by one of a multitude of upstream manufacturing plants
evidences a case in this category, where accurate assignment of blame is
very difficult." The law of liability typically attempts to resolve the
deterrence problem here by shifting the burden of proof,285 creating
prophylactic rules, 2 6 or apportioning loss. 287 Alternatively, the legisla-
ture may deal with the problem of "hidden" harms by regulation. Third,
detection may be inadequate where wrongful harm has been done to a sole
victim by a single, ascertainable defendant, but the victim may lack
adequate means to seek redress. Although this situation appears exceptional
in an age of contingency litigation, it has been thought to arise in the
context of insurance contracts,288 and in certain commercial contexts, at
least in California.2"9 On the criminal side, it may be supposed that the
financial inability of the government to locate, prosecute, and imprison all
lawbreakers constitutes a form of indigence that justifies the government's
routine use of penalty "multipliers" to ensure adequate deterrence against
violations of the criminal law.2ro
inadequate enforcement remains a plausible reason to allow punitive damages claims in many
contemporary mass tort situations.
284. For an introduction to the problem of mulfiple causation, see Robert J. Peaslee, Note, Multiple
Causation and Damage, 47 HIV. L. REv. 1127 (1934); Charles E. Carpenter, Concurrent Causation,
83 U. PA. L. REv. 941 (1935). See also Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1 (Cal. 1948).
285. See, e.g., Hall v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (shifting
burden of proof to defendant in multiple causation case).
286. For example, the difficulty of applying the due process test to determine if in the totality of
the circumstances, a particular interrogation was unduly coercive, see Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315
(1959), led to the preference for a prophylactic rule that attempted to allow suspects to avoid being
coerced by terminating the interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); supra note 128;
Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
287. See, e.g., Smith v. J.C. Penney Co., 525 P.2d 1299 (Or. 1974) (holding defendant liable for
all injuries where injuries were inseparable); Maddux v. Donaldson, 108 N.W.2d 33 (Mich. 1961)
(holding defendants jointly liable for the entirety where plaintiff cannot separate injuries).
288. See Comunale v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 328 P.2d 148 (Cal. 1958) (finding covenant of good
faith and fair dealing implicit in insurance contract, and giving rise to action by insured in tort or
contract for failure to settle); Crisci v. Security Ins. Co., 426 P.2d 173 (Cal. 1967) (same).
289. Seaman's Direct Buying Serv., Inc. v. Standard Oil Co., 686 P.2d 1158 (Cal. 1984) (allowing
tort remedy where supplier in bad faith denied contract existed); Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 610
P.2d 1330, 1337 n.12 (Cal. 1980) (suggesting that tort remedy for bad faith breach might be available
for employment contract).
290. The government's moral position here is problematic. It exercises its "monopsony" power over
criminal prosecutions, see Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL.
L. REV. 1471 (1993), by choosing not to remedy all violations possible. Instead, the government
selectively "multiplies" the punishment accorded to certain defendants to make up for its decision to
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The problem of inadequate expected penalties takes a slightly different
shape in the area of remedial law.291 At the remedial stage of litigation,
the enforcement is complete, and a chief concern from the social perspec-
tive is to ensure that the remedy imposed on the defendant is substantial
enough that, when combined with the extant level of enforcement, it
produces an expected penalty large enough to establish the socially optimal
level of deterrence.292 Unsurprisingly, the common law of remedies has
developed a number of roughly identical doctrines, usefully thought of as
"relegation doctrines," '293 which serve to relegate plaintiffs to a damages
remedy, and which at the same time signal when the expected market
remedy is not adequate to preclude socially harmful taking. The common
law here deters against socially harmful acts by supplying a more costly
penalty, a prohibitory remedy, to deter defendants in these cases, which in
turn helpfully stimulates higher enforcement rates. The relegation doctrines
form the dividing line between prohibitory and pricing remedies, and
between socially useful and socially harmful takings.
forgo certain prosecutions. Thus, adequate deterrence is sought by imprisoning fewer people for longer
periods.
291. Remedial devices that aim to increase deterrence may sometimes be employed in the same
cases as the substantive ones outlined in the text. Courts sometimes allow plaintiffs access to prohibitory
remedies in those classes of cases where the court concludes that the defendant's conduct has caused
widespread, small harms, is "hidden" among many possible wrongdoers, or has victimized those with
little means of legal redress. See I DOBBS, supra note 32, § 2.5(2) (stating that irreparable harm justifies
equitable remedies where potential for a multiplicity of suits, where a legal remedy is available but not
collectible, or where the damages cannot be measured with reasonable certainty). It is in these cases
where the potential of inadequate detection promises to render harm-based damages an inadequate
deterrent to harmful conduct, and where the fashioning of a prohibitory remedy can usefully provide
the added penalty without engendering problems of overdeterrence. However, courts should prefer to
use the substantive devices outlined in the text before turning to prohibitory remedies, due to the
clumsiness and other bad side effects of prohibitory remedies. For example, a court need not resort to
disgorgement of profits where the defendant's conduct can be addressed by a damages remedy coupled
with punitive damages. See Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), where the employment of the
disgorgement remedy, although ostensibly aimed at the same funds as a punitive award, deprived the
defendant of an opportunity to argue to the jury that his gains did not result from the breach, and thus
potentially overdeterred.
292. Of course, the magnitude of the penalty also affects enforcement rates. For example, the
availability of punitive damages certainly affects both the magnitude of the sanction and the likelihood
of plaintiffs suing. Even though as a matter of arithmetic the expected penalty is a function of both the
magnitude of the harm and the probability of enforcement, it makes sense at the remedies stage to
discuss the problem of ensuring adequate deterrence in terms of effecting the remedy, that is, the style
and magnitude of the sanction.
293. Professor Fiss grouped a similar set of doctrines under the phrase "subordinating doctrines."
Ftss, supra note 5, at 38-45. Because the set of doctrines differ slightly, a different term will be used
herein in order to avoid confusion.
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
At the heart of these relegation doctrines lies the irreparable injury
rule.29 This rule establishes the historic division between harm-based
damages and prohibitory remedies and, traditionally understood, creates a
presumption in favor of damages remedies.295 The rule has had an uneven
history and apparently faces a dubious future,296 but perhaps its virtues
have never been appreciated because of a failure to define it in an
understandable and relevant way. Understanding that a finding of
"inadequacy," and the corresponding resort to a prohibitory remedy,
constitutes a depletion of a public resource suggests a more concrete
definition. From a social perspective, "adequacy" indicates that the
predominate damages remedy is adequate to accomplish the social aims of
the sanction: to provide optimal deterrence to ensure that idiosyncratic
values are capitalized only when the social gain exceeds plaintiff's
nonidiosyncratic loss. Where the defendant threatens to take in a context
where the defendant does not promise to realize social gain, however, the
larger sanction of the prohibitory remedy is justified.
In general, defendants who take will not generate social gain where there
is no prevailing market price for the good taken. Without an adequate
substitute for the good available, the defendant's harmful act against the
plaintiff offers little promise of conversion into a capitalized asset. When
defendants take goods that have no prevailing market use, and thus no
market, they do so not to convert or "realize" plaintiff's socially useless
idiosyncratic valuations into social wealth, but rather to enjoy their own
idiosyncratic valuations of the good. In cases where the market is
"inadequate" because it does not supply a market value for the good,
defendants do not act in the social interest. Instead, their taking simply
transfers idiosyncratic values from plaintiff to themselves.
Another relegation doctrine, the "uniqueness" test, captures the same
division between marketed items and nonmarketed items, and thus between
pricing and prohibitory remedies. The "uniqueness" test holds that the
prohibitory remedy of specific performance will not be ordered unless the
subject good is sufficiently "unique." The courts' definition of uniqueness
parallels closely the notion of "inadequacy" or "irreparability" discussed in
294. This rule is also termed the "inadequate remedy at law" rule; although the two formulations
appear slightly different, they both ask if the alternative legal remedy is "adequate," thus rendering the
harm "reparable." See LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra note 5, at 8-9. But see Shreve,
supra note 40, at 393 (arguing that the two formulations express slightly different ideas).
295. See YoRio, supra note 84, § 2.2.
296. See generally LAYCOCK, IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE, supra note 5.
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reference to the remedy of injunctions, asking if a substitute performance
or good is "readily obtainable" at a price from persons other than the
defendant.297
The decision about whether a particular good is readily available on a
market, that is, if it is "unique" or if instead the injury is "reparable" by an
"adequate" sum of money, is a question of degree. For an economist, the
notion of cross-elasticity of demand suggests that every good, at some
point, has a substitute.29 It would appear, simply from the historical
prevalence of damages remedies, that courts have tended to adhere to a
rather broad notion of substitutability,2 9 thus restricting the availability
of prohibitory remedies. From a social perspective, the fact that a good is
unique means that the defendant who converts plaintiff's property interest
probably does so without promise of generating social wealth. By
definition, unique items are not part of a market, so defendant will not
facilitate the movement of market price, nor create a new one, nor use the
good in a more "profitable" manner from a social point of view. The good
is unique, it has no market price, it does not supply a ready input for more
profitable uses, and thus the defendant should be discouraged by the
onerous prohibitory remedy of specific performance or restitution in kind
from taking it.
The traditional common law "uniqueness" test and the irreparable injury
rule, while constraining the employment of prohibitory remedies, permit
flexible evolution of the extent to which idiosyncratic interests are
recognized.3°° For example, most jurisdictions have refused to protect the
297. Kronman, supra note 5, at 357-63 (describing uniqueness test, and arguing that it is a device
for protecting against undercompensation of plaintiff).
298. Id. at 359. Some scholars have helpfully described the polar ends of this spectrum by the terms
"thick market," where substitution is readily available, and "thin market," for where it is not. See
Levmore, supra note 104, at 79-81 ("Efficient resource allocation requires a well-developed or 'thick'
market composed of many active buyers and sellers.'); Merrill, supra note 196, at 76 (discussing how
a seller can extract economic rent from a buyer in a thin market, but not in a thick one). In general,
where a conventional market is absent, economists have suggested various substitutes that would elicit
the amount someone would pay for the interest at stake. See generally GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMIC
APPROACH TO HuMAN BEHAVIOR (1976).
299. See Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1155 ("[I]n a market economy it was supposed that, with rare
exceptions for such 'unique' items as heirlooms and objects of art, substantially similar goods were
available elsewhere.').
300. It is probably myopic for judges or lawyers to presume that remedial law has much of a role
in "recognizing" idiosyncratic values. Market price will capture such values if they are less than
completely idiosyncratic: that is, if they are shared by some significant number of market participants.
Moreover, these movements in market prices probably capture and protect far more valuations than do
movements in judicial doctrine, suggesting that courts should, in configuring remedies, routinely resort
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sentimental or idiosyncratic valuations that plaintiffs hold toward converted
"personalty."3°' On the other hand, historically most jurisdictions protect-
ed such sentimental values in regard to land,3" to the point at which
specific performance of land contracts and constructive trusts, a
restitutionary device, were routinely imposed for conversions of real
property. 3 This dichotomy reflected the courts' collective judgment that
"parcels of land are unique":3 no two acres of land or personal residenc-
es were substitutes. Both of these lines are moving: regarding land, some
courts have awarded the seller specific performance;0 s on the other hand,
courts have compensated for some sentimental attachments to personal-
ty.
30 6
The aim of this justification of prohibitory remedies is not to declare any
particular degree of substitutability optimal. Rather, it is to defend the
traditional limitations that these relegation doctrines place on the employ-
ment of prohibitory remedies. Contrary to the sustained criticisms of
commentators, the traditional irreparable injury rule and the "uniqueness"
doctrine continue to serve an important role in shaping the remedial law
system.3 7 By creating the preference for pricing remedies, they encourage
defendants to take and pay when doing so promises to "realize" social
wealth; by promoting the use of prohibitory remedies when markets are not
adequate, they penalize defendants who take and pay where their actions
do not promise social wealth.
to market price, and not undertake the considerable expense of deciding whether to award a prohibitory
remedy or to award some damages remedy that explicitly embraces idiosyncratic or subjective values.
301. Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 593 P.2d 1308 (Wash. 1979) (holding that damages do not include
sentimental value of lost camera film as damages); Schwartz v. Crozier, 565 N.Y.S.2d 567 (App. Div.
1991) (limiting car to market price). Dobbs reports that courts have ameliorated this rule somewhat in
cases involving destroyed personal property where the primary value is sentimental by allowing
recovery for "value to the owner." 1 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 5.16(3). Although this measure explicitly
excludes "sentimental value," Dobbs suggests that it supplies a means of some compensation of
sentimental value, while preventing oversized awards. Id.
302. See Farnsworth, supra note 4, at 1154 ("Each parcel, however ordinary, was considered to be
'unique'... .').
303. See Kronman, supra note 5, at 377.
304. See 1 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 2.5(2); see also Schwartz, supra note 5, at 272-73; Famsworth,
supra note 4, at 1154-55.
305. See 3 DOBBS, supra note 32, § 12.12(3).
306. See 2 id. § 5.16(3).
307. See YoPmO, supra note 84, § 2.1 (describing the adequacy test as the "linchpin" of specific
performance). In other contexts, other remedial doctrines also serve to relegate plaintiffs to damages
remedies, most notably the prior restraint doctrine, which essentially places a plaintiff's personal
reputation in regards to libel in the take-and-pay system. See generally FISS, supra note 5, at 46-47.
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Fortunately, the employment of prohibitory remedies in this limited
capacity either avoids or minimizes the problems associated with their more
regular employment. The frequent use of prohibitory remedies, uninhibited
by the relegation doctrines, will tend to cause a loss in the teaching
function of remedies, and will tend, if plaintiffs expect the prohibitory
remedy to constitute the routinely available remedy, to generate moral
hazards. Thus, a predominate use of prohibitory remedies would engender
social costs. The relegation doctrines minimize those costs by permitting
the use of prohibitory remedies only where the defendant's take and pay
will likely not yield social gain.
VI. CONCLUSION
Full compensation is an appealing goal, but it is not one that the law of
remedies must necessarily fulfill. The available remedial means of ensuring
full compensation, such as injunctions, specific performance and restitution,
are issued at a price, not just to the defendant, but also to the community,
and thus their imposition constitutes a transfer from third parties to the
victims of harm. Although communities may wish to perform this transfer,
and may do so in any number of ways, the law of remedies is a particularly
undesirable vehicle to accomplish it. The question over whether to provide
full compensation is not a matter of corrective justice, which is remedial
law's concern, but of distributive justice, and ought to be considered as
such.
This normative contention is supported by the practical observations that,
if prohibitory remedies were employed as the vehicle to provide full
compensation, as has been urged by many commentators, they would
engender numerous problems in the law's fulfillment of other accepted
goals of a remedial system. A remedial system in which prohibitory
remedies predominated would produce haphazard and imprecise deterrence,
would likely diminish precautionary behavior, would lead to wealth
diminishment, and might even frustrate the goal of full compensation. If the
use of prohibitory remedies is limited to buttressing the dominant damages
remedy in cases where it is inadequate, prohibitory remedies represent
market-enhancing, not market-minimizing, answers for hard cases. Used
with this precision of purpose, their deterrent effect can be more easily
weighed against their costs. Courts that wish to employ a prohibitory
remedy may, with a clearer understanding of its proper role in a market-
oriented damages system, examine the gains and risks from such an
employment with more exactitude and rigor than simply attempting to
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divine if a defendant's enrichment was in some sense "unjust," or if some
undefined notion of "justice" demands that plaintiff's idiosyncratic harm
be protected to provide full compensation.
Prohibitory remedies are valuable to a remedial system in which harm-
based "pricing" remedies predominate. They serve a secondary role in
providing for adequate deterrence, a social good, where needed to separate
wealth-producing behavior from behavior that simply redistributes utility
with no corresponding social benefit. Their infrequent employment
minimizes or eliminates the concerns that preclude their widespread use.
Importantly, the common law serves well to harness these potentially
destructive remedies by virtue of the "relegation" doctrines, such as the
"uniqueness" test and the "irreparable injury" rule. The sustained academic
attack on these doctrines, along with the criticisms of the damages remedy,
threatens to unleash the ethic of full compensation on remedial law,
unsupported by a convincing theory of corrective justice and with little
promise of practical success.
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